A battle for access to the streets of a "World-Class African City": Assessing the challenges facing the City of Johannesburg in the management of street trading in the inner-city by Zulu, Nompumelelo
A battle for access to the streets of a “World-Class African City”: Assessing the Challenges 
Facing the City of Johannesburg in the Management of Street Trading in the Inner-City 
Nompumelelo Zulu 
ZLXNOM015 
A [minor]dissertation submitted in [partial] fullfilment of the requirements for the award of 
the degree of Master of Philosophy in Public Policy and Administration 
Faculty of the Humanities 




















The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 












This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. 
It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from 
the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced. 
Signature: Date:   11/02/2019 
i  
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank everyone who has contributed to this process. Thank you to the City of 
Johannesburg’s Informal Trading Unit: Elliot Dubasi, Dumisani Thela, Rebecca Khumalo and 
Raymond Mabaso. I am deeply grateful for your time, your openness, your cooperation, and 
participation in this study. You give me hope for the future of street trading in Johannesburg’s 
inner-city. Thank you, Professor Robert Cameron, for your insight and advice. Lastly, thank 
you to my family for their unconditional support throughout this journey. 
ii  
Abstract 
The paper identifies the main challenges faced by the City of Johannesburg in the management 
of street trading in Johannesburg’s inner-city. Street trading is very important as it constitutes 
a great proportion of the informal sector in South Africa, and it plays a great role in the 
alleviation of poverty and unemployment. Government acknowledges the significance of street 
trading but this does not translate into urban policy and practice. There is a need for government 
to be more supportive and developmental in the management of street trading in urban 
governance. 
 
The paper found that the 2013 Constitutional Court Judgement on Operation Clean Sweep has 
brought about a shift in the City of Johannesburg’s approach and attitude towards street trading, 
however, key challenges remain. Firstly, the City of Johannesburg needs to establish a holistic, 
developmental and collaborative management model for street trading as the current one is 
fragmented and inconsistent. The mismanagement of street trading has left traders vulnerable 
to police harassment and corruption, and it has resulted in the “crime and grime” the City of 
Johannesburg so often blames street trading for. Secondly, the City of Johannesburg needs to 
balance its desire to attain world-class African city status with the needs of the poor and 
marginalized – economic development, urban renewal and investment should not take place at 
the expense of the poor. Thirdly, street traders need to be at the center of the management 
model, currently business and private interests are at the center of the model. Lastly, the City 
of Johannesburg needs to be more creative and lenient in accommodating the growing number 
of street traders in the inner-city. The City of Johannesburg needs to stop criminalizing street 
trading through the creation of scarcity. 
 
The findings of this paper have implications for urban management policy and practice. 
Research was conducted through interviews with the Department of Economic Development 
officials responsible for street trading; draft policy and government documents were used; and 
secondary sources were drawn upon. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.0. Background to the Study: Growing Informal Economy - Rising Unemployment 
and Poverty 
There has been an increasing interest in the informal economy in the past number of years. 
This is because the informal economy is becoming a permanent part of societies all over the 
world, and governments have come to accept that it is here to stay. Currently, including 
agriculture, more than 61% of the world’s employed population (about 2 billion people) make 
their living in the informal economy (ILO, 2018:v). This growth and permanence has been 
further strengthened by the recognition that there is a strong link and relationship between the 
formal economy and the informal economy, a link and relationship that was previously denied 
and ignored. 
 
The informal economy has grown out of the failure of the formal economy to generate 
sufficient employment for the masses. Therefore, it plays a significant role in alleviating 
poverty and unemployment in many countries, especially developing countries. It has 
increasingly become the main source of livelihood for many of the poor and vulnerable. 
However, although governments acknowledge the informal economy’s significance and 
contribution to the overall economy, this does not translate into practice. There is a disjuncture 
and inconsistency found in government policy and practice when it comes to the management 
of informal trading – government policy aims to be supportive and developmental but practice 
and implementation tends to be restrictive and repressive. This is detrimental to the livelihoods 
of those operating in the informal economy. 
 
The most visible form of the informal economy is street trading. Street trading is evident world- 
wide and it is a distinct feature of cities. There is growing acknowledgement that street trading 
needs to be incorporated in urban planning and development, however this has not translated 
into practice. Governance approaches towards the management of this contested economic 
activity varies from being violent and repressive, to being supportive and developmental. At 
the heart of this conflict and contestation is access to the streets and conflict over land-use as 
competing stakeholders claim access to urban space. This is clearly evident in South Africa’s 
Johannesburg. The end of apartheid saw the significant growth of the informal economy, 
especially street trading. This resulted in urban spaces, especially city centres, being claimed 
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as working sites for informal work. This presented a challenge for city officials as it resulted 
in capital flight and urban decay. In an effort to reverse capital flight and urban decay; gain 
investment in the inner-city; and attain world-class city status, urban renewal projects were 
prioritized and invested in. These have had detrimental effects on the working poor and have 
led to the prohibition, restriction and criminalisation of economic activities such as street 
trading. 
 
The management of street trading in South Africa has been inconsistent. Although significant 
progress has been made since the end of apartheid, many challenges still remain. Policy tends 
to be developmental and progressive but implementation and practice is harsh, restrictive and 
repressive – and in many instances reminiscent of repressive enforcement under apartheid. The 
most progressive case in street trading management in South Africa has been Durban – 
collaborative and consultative planning and management was evident in the city’s urban 
renewal strategy. This contrasts the City of Johannesburg (COJ or the City) that has been 
restrictive, repressive and exclusionary in its management of street trading. This is because the 
City has prioritised economic growth, investment and the attainment of world-class city status 
over the socio-economic needs of the urban poor. Street trading is often synonymous with 
urban decay and seen as disorderly and grimy – all at odds with the image of a world-class city. 
This has detrimental implications for the livelihoods of the urban poor, especially in a country 
where there is rising unemployment. 
 
1.1. Aims of the Study 
The main aim of this study is to determine the challenges facing the City of Johannesburg in 
the management of street trading in the inner-city. Street trading is an important element of the 
informal economy, so the study is interested in determining how the City is supporting this 
element especially in the context of rising unemployment. Efforts made towards answering this 
question revealed the complexity of street trading in the inner-city and as a result new questions 
emerged. 
 
Guiding sub-questions used to answer the overall research question were: 
• Who manages street trading in the City , i.e. what are the institutional arrangements in 
place to manage street trading? 
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• What is the City’s policy and legislation environment and context? What are the 
implications of this on the management of street traders? 
• Has the City’s management of street trading changed Post-Operation Clean Sweep? If 
so, what are the key shifts? 
• Another key question that emerged during analysis is, why is the City criminalizing 
street trading and marginalizing street traders? 
 
The study is also interested in seeing how the City manages competing interests when it comes 
to the management of street trading and access to urban space. 
 
The study has chosen to focus on street trading because of its significant contribution to the 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the alleviation of poverty and unemployment. 
Statistics South Africa’s 2016 Quarterly Labour Force Survey found that 2 565 000 South 
Africans work in the informal sector (2016:vi; Rogan & Skinner, 2017). That means 16.4% of 
total employment in South Africa is found in the informal sector. 1 015 600 of those 2 565 000 
South Africans in the informal sector are street traders, that is 40, 5% of the informal sector 
(Statistics South Africa, 2016:vi; Rogan & Skinner, 2017). Furthermore, it was also found that 
street trading makes a 5.2% contribution to the country’s GDP (Statistics South Africa, 2016). 
It is therefore very important that cities invest in strengthening and supporting street trading as 
it plays a significant role in the country. 
 
In order to achieve this aim, the study will look at the legal and legislative framework in place 
to govern and manage street trading in the country and urban centres; it will look at the 
institutional and management framework the City has in place to manage street trading – and 
the fault lines evident in those frameworks; it will look at Operation Clean Sweep that took 
place in 2013 in an effort to tackle the challenges presented by street trading in the inner-city; 
and what developments have taken place Post-Operation Clean Sweep; and lastly, it will briefly 
look at the lived experiences of street traders to further understand the challenges facing the 
City in the management of street trading. 
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The City of Johannesburg has been chosen as a case study as street trading has a long history 
in its urban centre. The research explores the implications of the City’s urban policy, practice 
and governance in the management of street trading in the inner-city. The inner-city is the main 
focus of the study as it has a long history of being a space of conflict and contestation. But 
more importantly, since the inner-city is the most lucrative area for economic activity and 
serves a multiplicity of uses, it is the area where the regulation of street trading is highly 
restricted. 
 
The City has several conflicting interests to balance in the management of street trading in the 
inner-city – street traders, business, property owners, international investors and citizens – and 
how the City juggles and manages these interests has great implications for the livelihoods of 
street traders. 
 
The COJ was also chosen due to its highly controversial and unconstitutional clean sweep that 
took place in 2013. Operation Clean Sweep saw 1000s of street traders illegally evicted from 
their trading sites and banned from trading for a number of months. The case aptly captures the 
challenges of managing street trading and managing conflicting interests whilst trying to attain 
world-class city status. It aptly illustrates the battle for access to urban space in the city centre. 
And it aptly captures the restrictive and repressive management of street trading that is evident 
in urban governance. 
 
1.2. Methodology 
The research relied on qualitative research methods. A case study of Johannesburg was done. 
Findings were based on the perceptions of interviews with the Informal Trading Unit officials, 
and the review of primary policy documents and draft plans and proposals. These were used 
to determine the performance of the COJ and its challenges in managing street trading in the 




City officials, specifically the Informal Trading Unit, were the main people interviewed for 
this research. The Informal Trading Unit comprises of 4 officials: 
5  
• Elliot Dubasi, who is the Acting-Head of Informal Trading Unit and responsible for 
coordinating and overseeing street trading across the City. 
• Dumisani Thela, who is responsible for Events. He is in charge of coordinating street 
trading for major city events such as soccer games. 
• Rebecca Khumalo is responsible for the administrative operation of the Unit, and has 
been responsible for dealing with the implications of the Constitutional Court 
Judgement on Operation Clean Sweep. 
• Raymond Mabaso is responsible for dealing with petitions and challenges brought 
forward by street traders. 
Permission was granted to name the above officials and to quote them as sources. 
 
 
The Unit was engaged to obtain an understanding of the institutional and policy environment 
street trading operates within in the City. This engagement was informative and helpful for my 
research. The team is very passionate about street trading and believes in its power and 
potential to fight poverty and unemployment in the country. The key challenge that they all 
cited in the management of street trading is the Department of Economic Development’s (DED 
or Department) fragmented management model. Elliot (2018) stated that there is a lack of 
uniformity in the management of street trading across the City. Raymond (2018) further 
commented that the DED is ‘too hands-off in its approach to street trade management’; he 
stated that there was a lack of coordination and no reporting line to the DED. 
 
Primary Documents 
Primary documents reviewed included: 
• Draft Informal Trading Implementation Plan 
• Informal Trading Policy Background 
• 2009 Informal Trading Policy 
• COJ Informal Trading By-Laws 
• Businesses Act No. 71 of 1991 
• Minutes of the 68th   Ordinary Meeting of the City of Johannesburg Council 
• Presentation to Inner City Informal Trading Sector, 26 April 2016 
• Operation Clean Sweep Constitutional Court Ruling 
• Inner City Draft List of streets proposed for Promulgation of Informal Trading Areas 
Management Plan (Traffic Study) 
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• Map of the COJ’s Draft Inner City Trading Plan 
 
Secondary Sources 
This research heavily relied on secondary sources for the lived experience of street traders, and 
the history of the Metropolitan Trading Company and Central Johannesburg Partnership. This 
was done intentionally, as the main focus of the research was to examine the state of street 
trading management from a City governance perspective not from a street traders’ experience 
and perspective. This has unfortunately left some gaps and limitations to this study. 
 
Secondary documents, such as consultant reports, were used to understand the management 
challenges of MTC that eventually led to it disbanding. 
 
The processes and institutions I needed to evaluate and review in order to adequately answer 
my research question were put on hold after Operation Clean Sweep, so there are some gaps 
and limitations to the knowledge provided. 
 
1.3. Structure of Dissertation 
The study is divided into six chapters. 
 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the research paper and outlines the key research question and sub- 
questions. It highlights the significance of the study and its relevance and implications for 
urban policy towards the management of street trading. 
 
Chapter 2 is the literature review. It looks at existing knowledge in the informal economy: the 
different schools of thought that explain the informal economy; the significance of the informal 
economy; its key characteristics and the key debates surrounding the informal economy. It then 
narrows its focus to a specific sector in the informal economy, street trading. It highlights 
literature around street trading in relation to its significance and the various government 
approaches to the management and regulation of street trading. It highlights different policy 
approaches to street trading and discusses the primary areas of contestation when it comes to 
street trading. 
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Chapter 3 specifically looks at the informal economy in South Africa. It seeks to explain and 
make sense of the informal economy through two schools of thought – the structuralist and 
dualist schools of thought. It highlights the contentious rhetoric that has informed key policy 
in the informal economy. It then narrows its focus to street trading in South Africa: it highlights 
the significance of street trading in South Africa; the history of street trading in South Africa 
with a focus on Johannesburg; and the shift in the government’s approach and policy towards 
street trading and the informal economy post-apartheid; it also looks at the legal and legislative 
framework in place to govern street trading. 
 
Chapter 4 looks at the institutional and management framework in place to manage street 
trading in Johannesburg. It discusses the importance of the institutional location of street 
trading and highlights the importance of coordination and collaboration across municipal 
departments and key stakeholders in the sector to establish an effective and efficient 
management approach to street trading. It also highlights the different entities responsible for 
street trading in Johannesburg, and the key institutions (or lack thereof) that are in place to 
promote participatory and collaborative planning and management in the sector. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses Operation Clean Sweep which took place in 2013, and it looks at how 
Operation Clean Sweep has affected the City’s approach to street trading. It assesses the 
changes that have been made Post-Operation Clean Sweep and the implications those changes 
have had on the livelihoods of street traders. 
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the key findings of the study and the implications these findings have on 
urban policy and practice in the management of street trading, and the implications they have 
on the livelihoods of street traders. 
 
Chapter 7 concludes the paper and summarizes the chapters. The limitations of the study and 
future areas of research are also discussed. 
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This chapter will review the literature of this study: the informal economy and street trading. 
It will start off by looking at the definitions of the informal economy, then it will discuss the 
history of the informal economy, and look at the key characteristics, size and significance of 
the informal economy. It will then highlight the key policy debates of regulating and 
formalizing the informal economy. After establishing the context, the chapter will narrow its 
focus on street trading within the informal economy; focusing on definitions; key debates and 
trends in governance, policy and legislation surrounding street trading. It will highlight the 
key issues and challenges facing urban governance when dealing with street trading in cities. 
 
2.1. The Informal Economy 
 
 
2.1.1. Defining the Informal Economy 
There are three official statistical terms and definitions when it comes to this subject (Chen, 
2012:8): 
 
1. The informal sector ‘refers to the production and employment that takes place in 
unincorporated small or unregistered enterprises’ 
2. Informal employment ‘refers to employment without legal and social protection – both 
inside and outside the informal sector’ 
3. Informal economy ‘refers to all units, activities and workers so defined and the output 
from them’ 
 
Informal employees are then classified into two categories: non-wage employees and wage 
employees (Chen, 2012:7-8). Non-wage employees are self-employed, whereas wage 
employees are hired ‘without social protection contributions by formal or informal 
enterprises or as paid domestic workers by households’ (Chen, 2012:7). 
 
The informal sector is heterogenous and although there are some similarities world-wide, it 
often takes up different forms in different countries: 
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“…the “informal sector” is invoked to refer to street vendors in Bogota; rickshaw 
pullers in Hanoi and Calcutta; garbage collectors in Cairo; home-based garment 
workers in Manila, Madeira, Mexico City, and Toronto; and home-based electronic 
workers in Leeds, Istanbul, and Kuala Lumpur.” (Chen, 2012:4). 
 
2.1.2. History of the Informal Economy 
 
 
“The informal economy is here to stay. It is not something temporary. It is not a pause on a 
road leading to jobs for everyone in the formal economy. All over the world, the size of the 
informal economy and the number of workers within it have been growing.” 
(Lund, Nicholson & Skinner, 2000:9) 
 
 
During the 1950s and 60s, there was a widely received assumption that the right mix of 
economic policies and resources would transform low-income traditional economies into 
‘dynamic modern economies’ (Chen, 2012:2; Devey et al., 2003:6; Chen et al., 2001:3). It was 
argued that this transformation would do away with ‘petty trade small-scale production and a 
range of casual jobs’ (Chen, 2012:2). This assumption was reflected in W. Arthur Lewis’s 
prediction that economic development in developing countries would, in the long-run, create 
enough modern jobs to absorb surplus labour (Lewis, 1954; Chen, 2012:2). This prediction was 
reinforced and reiterated by the successful rebuilding of Europe and Japan after World War II, 
and the growth of mass production in Europe and North America during the 1950s and 60s 
(Chen, 2012:2). 
 
However, in the 1960s people began to doubt this because of rising unemployment in 
developing countries (Chen, 2012:3). This was because the modern economy created an 
imbalance between population growth and employment, and a mismatch in skills – the skills 
needed by the modern economy were skills the majority of the population lacked (Skinner, 
2008; Chen, 2012:3). In response to this concern, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
introduced multi-disciplinary employment missions in various developing countries, the first 
mission took place in Kenya in 1972. The mission found that the trading sector, which they 
called the informal sector, included a variety of ‘profitable and efficient’ activities and 
enterprises (Chen, 2012:3). The term ‘informal sector’ was coined by Keith Hart in his 1971 
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study of low-income activities among unskilled migrants from Northern Ghana to Accra who 
could not find employment (Hart, 1973; Chen, 2012:3). 
 
Hart and the ILO Kenya Mission were very positive about the informal sector and saw its 
potential to create economic employment and reduce poverty (Hart, 1973; Chen, 2012:3). But 
despite all of this, many development theorists continued to believe that these economies would 
disappear once developing countries achieved a certain level of economic growth and 
industrialization. Others argued that this development could manifest itself in different forms 
in developing countries and lead to the growth of the informal economy. The latter proved to 
be true. 
 
In the 1980s, with the rise of capitalism – which advocates for decentralization, flexibility, 
competition, reducing costs of production etc. – the informal economy became a more 
permanent feature and grew bigger in size (Chen, 2012:3-4; Chen et al., 2001:3-5; Devey et 
al., 2003:6-9). It was also revealed that employment in the informal sector increased in many 
countries during periods of economic crisis and political transition (Tokman, 1996; Chen, 
2012:4). In the 1990s the Asian economic crisis led to millions seeking and creating jobs in the 
informal economy (Chen, 2012:4), and structural adjustment programmes in Africa also 
resulted in the growth of employment in the informal sector (Chen, 2012:4). The globalization 
of the economy has also led to the growth of the informal sector. 
 
2.1.3. Informal Economy: Characteristics, Size and Trends 
Over the number of decades, the interest in the informal economy has risen and fallen. 
Recently, there has been a renewed interest in the informal economy. This is due to three 
main reasons: 
 
Firstly, the informal economy has grown worldwide and it has taken on different shapes and 
sizes. Currently when including agriculture, more than 61% of the world’s employed 
population (about 2 billion people) make their living in the informal economy (ILO, 2018:v). 
Disaggregated: Africa sits at 85, 8%; Asia and the Pacific, 68, 2%; North and South America, 
40,0%; Europe and Central Asia, 25,1%; and Arab states, 68,6% (ILO, 2018). When excluding 
agriculture, the figure drops down to 50,5%. And the number of employees in the informal 
economy excluding agriculture remain very high in Africa, Arab states, and Asia and the 
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Pacific: 71,9%; 63,9%; and 59,2% respectively (ILO, 2018). It is evident that the informal 
economy is here to stay. 
 
Secondly, the growth of the informal economy has revealed the links between informality and 
economic growth; and informality, poverty and inequality. 
 
Lastly, previously many academics denied the link between the informal economy and the 
formal economy. Academics denied the link between the informal and formal economy 
because they believed that the informal economy was insignificant, temporary and made little 
to no contribution to the economy. But now there is growing recognition that the two are 
intrinsically linked. This was highlighted by Charmes study of the contribution of the informal 
sector to the total GDP in developing countries (the total excludes agricultural activities). He 
found that in Asia, the informal sector contributed 27.7% to the GDP; in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
27.0%; and in North Africa, 22.6% (Charmes, 2000:2). These figures are estimates, there is no 
way of measuring the accurate size of the informal sector and its contribution to the economy 
because of its changing nature and the fact that it presents itself in different forms in different 
places (Charmes, 2000:10; Chen et al., 2001; Chen, 2012:17). The informal economy is large, 
heterogenous, and highly segmented. As Wilken (1975) aptly stated: 
 
“The informal sector Heffalump is a variegated sort of animal, appearing in different forms 
in different places. So it is not surprising that there is disagreement about the nature of the 
Beast” 
 
There are four dominant schools of thought that aim to analyse and understand the causation, 
nature, activities, and characteristics of the informal economy. 
 
The dualists say that the informal economy is made up of marginal activities that are distinct 
from the formal economy and not related to the formal sector (Hart, 1973; Tokman, 1996; 
Chen, 2012:11). They do not acknowledge the link between the formal and informal sector. 
Dualists believe that the existence of the informal economy is due to exclusion from the modern 
economy which has created an imbalance between population growth and employment 
opportunities; and a mismatch between skills required and skills available within the public 
(Skinner, 2008). Dualists recommend that the government create more jobs and provide credit 
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and business development services to informal operations, as well as basic infrastructure and 
social services. 
 
Structuralists understand the informal economy to be comprised of small subordinate economic 
units and workers that serve to reduce input and labour costs of large capitalist firms in order 
to increase the competitiveness and profitability of these firms (Castells & Portes, 1989; Chen, 
2012:5). Structuralists acknowledge the link between the formal and informal economy, they 
understand that the two are intrinsically linked and that the former is a result of capitalism and 
globalisation. Due to capitalism and globalisation, firms aim to reduce labour and production 
costs by outsourcing cheap goods and services (to the informal economy) and in turn increasing 
competitiveness and profitability nationally and globally. Structuralists argue that government 
should address the unequal relationship between big business and subordinate economic units 
by regulating both commercial and employment relationships. 
 
Legalists believe that the informal economy is made up of individuals who choose to be part 
of it. They argue that these individuals want to avoid the costs, time and effort of formal 
regulations. And they are required to have property rights (which they do not have) in order to 
convert their assets into legally recognizable assets (de Soto, 2000). They argue that the highly 
bureaucratic and hostile legal system of formalization leads individuals who are self-employed 
into operating informally. The barriers of entry are high and the processes and requirements to 
become formal are not accessible. Legalists therefore advocate for less red tape, simpler 
processes of formalization and a break down in barriers of entry (de Soto, 2000; Chen, 2012:5). 
Legalists argue that government should extend legal property rights for the assets held by 
informal enterprises in order to help them realize their potential to make real capital. 
 
Voluntarists believe that the informal economy is made up of individuals who intentionally 
seek to avoid regulation and taxation. But unlike the legalists, they do not attribute this to the 
formalization process. They believe that individuals choose this option after weighing the costs 
and benefits of being formal versus being informal. Voluntarists advocate for the formal 
regulation of the informal economy in order to increase the tax base and reduce unfair bias to 
informal enterprises. They argue that informal enterprises should be brought under regulation 
because it is unfair that they are avoiding costs and taxes that formal firms have to pay. 
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There is a common misconception that employment under the informal economy is survivalist, 
but research has shown that this is not the case. There is no single causal theory that can explain 
the existence of the informal economy. The informal economy is large and heterogenous so 
one would have to look at each sector and segment to explain informal employment (Chen, 
2012:11). It seems that necessity (economic crises, political transition, globalization and 
capitalism), as well as choice (avoiding regulation and taxes) drive informality. 
 
2.1.4. Policy Debates 
The main policy debates around the informal economy centre around regulation and 
formalization. 
 
2.1.4.1. Over-Regulation, De-regulation, No regulation 
There are two key issues here: One, should the government intervene and if so how? Two, what 
are appropriate regulations? 
 
There are two opposing views regarding government intervention. The first view argues against 
intervention, stating that government intervention in the economy leads to inefficiencies in the 
market (Chen et al., 2012:13). This view believes that the informal economy will decline over 
time as the economy grows. The second view argues that the government needs to intervene 
and establish appropriate regulations, laws and policies to correct the biases in existing 
regulations, laws and policies that favour the formal economy to the disadvantage of the 
informal economy (Weeks, 1975). This view believes that the government needs to do more to 
support the informal economy and create more productivity and growth in the informal sector 
because it has significant potential (Weeks, 1975). 
 
Over-regulation, according to legalists, is costly and creates high barriers of entry. For 
example, some informal workers cannot afford to obtain a permit or license to operate, and for 
some the registration process is not accessible (i.e.: registration forms are not in their home 
language or they are illiterate) so many opt to operate informally. The state creates informality 
through over-regulation. The state creates unrealistic laws and regulations that leave people 
with no choice but to break them, especially for people who are operating in the informal 
economy for survivalist reasons. Laws and regulations tend to be disconnected from what is 
happening on the ground, and ill-adapted and non-responsive to social or economic needs (Roy, 
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2009; Yitachel, 2009). This leads to the state criminalizing, illegalizing and informalizing 
people and communities (Roy, 2009; Yitachel, 2009). 
 
Deregulation, as is evident in capitalism and globalisation, leads to exploitation. Therefore, 
there is a need to regulate the labour market, and employee-employer relations due to the 
flexibility of employment contracts. 
 
No regulation is as costly and damaging as over-regulation. It tends to lead to conflict, violence, 
corruption and chaos (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015; Chen, 2012; Skinner, 2008). 
 
It is clear that there is a need for government intervention and regulation of the informal 
economy. But this has to be done sector by sector within the informal economy, as it is not 
possible to enforce the same kind of regulation for the entire informal economy (Chen, 
2012:14). Street vendors need different regulations to sweatshop workers, in the same way that 
sweatshop workers need different regulations to homebased garment workers. There is also a 
need for a balance when it comes to regulation, regulations should not be repressive and 
restrictive, they need to create a supportive environment that is conducive to growth. 
 
2.1.4.2. Formalization 
Many scholars question whether the informal economy should be formalized, and if so how 
should it be done. Other scholars question the meaning of formalizing the informal economy, 
they want to know what that looks like in policy and practice. Scholars’ responses to these 
issues depends on their attitude towards the informal economy, and their understanding of the 
informal economy. 
 
For the formal economy it means registering and taxing informal enterprises. But for informal 
workers, it means so much more. It means gaining access to legal and social protection; gaining 
access to support services such as skills and business development; having the right to organise; 
being seen as legitimate instead of continuously being excluded and criminalized (Chen, 2006; 
2012:15-16; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). The government needs to understand that when talking 
about formalizing the informal economy, informal workers will expect benefits. And the 
government will need to work sector by sector, as each sector’s needs will be different. 
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These policy debates require a comprehensive and context specific approach. And they require 
constant communication and collaboration between different stakeholders, including informal 
employees. 
 
2.1.5. Organising in the informal economy: trends and barriers to organisations 
Organising in the informal economy has proved to be a challenge. This is due to a number of 
reasons: lack of resources and skills; lack of consistency; lack of trust; political barriers; 
members do not have the time to attend meetings and they cannot afford to be part of an 
organisation because time is money; and there is little support from formal economy unions 
(Lund, Nicholson & Skinner, 2000:89-93). Many organisations, such as Women in Informal 
Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) and StreetNet, have invested in building 
capacity in informal economy unions and equipping members with key skills to run an 
organisation that is helpful to all the people they seek to serve (Horn, 2014). 
 
For the organisation to be productive and efficient, a group of people are needed to put in the 
time and work to ensure that members’ needs and interests are being met. Many informal 
workers do not have the time to do this, especially survivalist informal workers as being away 
from work for any period of time costs money. In addition to that, many members lack the 
skills to efficiently run an organisation (Lund, Nicholson & Skinner, 2000:89-93; Bénit- 
Gbaffou, 2014). 
 
Furthermore, these organisations are comprised of people who cannot afford to pay 
membership fees. Membership fees are necessary to meet the members’ interests and needs. 
Organisations do not survive because they cannot continue operating financially (Lund, 
Nicholson & Skinner, 2000:89-93; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014). 
 
Scepticism surrounds organisations in the informal economy which makes it difficult to attract 
members. This scepticism is due to corruption as informal workers have had experiences where 
they have paid their membership fees and seen the organisation misuse their funds. Many also 
feel that organisations are self-interested and never deliver on their promises (Lund, Nicholson 
& Skinner, 2000:89-93; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014). 
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Historically, informal workers have chosen to operate individually and have not seen the need 
or benefit of joining an organisation (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014). But recently, more informal 
workers have realized the need and benefit of being part of an organisation dedicated to fighting 
for their rights. Over the past few years, such organisations have been the champions of court 
cases against municipal governments. This has been evident in India (National Association of 
Street Vendors of India (NASVI) and Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA)), and 
South Africa (South African Informal Traders Forum (SAITF)). Unions are also becoming 
more vocal in establishing meaningful platforms for engagement with officials when it comes 
to policies that affect their livelihoods. They are rejecting the existence of unaccountable 
municipal forums that are there as a mechanism to control street traders as opposed to using 
them as a mechanism to meaningfully engage with vendors (Horn, 2014; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014; 
Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). 
 
The focus will now be narrowed down to street trading in the informal economy. 
 
 
2.2. Street Trading 
2.2.1. Definitions 
In the broadest sense, street traders are those who belong to the informal economy and trade in 
the streets (Lund, Nicholson & Skinner, 2000:10). They are the most visible amongst the 
informal economy. 
 
Bénit-Gbaffou (2015:23) defines street trading as any trading that takes place on the street. She 
disagrees with using street trading and informal trading interchangeably as not all street trading 
is informal. It all depends on the relevant city’s by-laws. She draws on Castells and Portes’ 
(1989) definition of the informal: activities, ways of generating income that are ‘unregulated 
by the institution of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are 
regulated’. To Bénit-Gbaffou, formality and informality is related to management and 
municipal by-laws which determine what is formal and informal. Therefore, street trading can 
be formal (regulated) or informal (unregulated) and it is incorrect to assume that all street 
trading is informal. 
 




“…for example tourist souvenirs, newspapers and candy in many North American 
and European cities, or … cooked foods, groceries and hardware through to clothing 
and electrical appliances. Shoe-shining, hair-cutting, document typing, and the repair 
of shoes, clothes, bicycles, motorcycles and cars, are all common street services.” 
(Bromley, 2000:3) 
 
Street traders and street vendors will be used interchangeably. 
 
 
2.2.2. Street Trading: Characteristics, Size and Significance 
Street trading plays a significant role in urban economies. It contributes to cities financially, it 
brings vibrancy and culture, and it offers a wide range of accessible and affordable services 
and goods to the public. 
 
The Informal Economy Monitoring Study (IEMS) highlighted ways street vendors strengthen 
communities in 5 different cities (Roever, 2014): 
 
• Most street traders are the sole breadwinners, so they provide the main source of income 
for their households. 
• Street traders contribute to the formal economy in a significant way as they source their 
goods from formal enterprises. 
• Street traders play a role in keeping the streets clean and safe for the public, in order to 
ensure a clean and safe environment for their customers. 
• Street vendors, contribute to the city’s revenue through payments for licenses and 
permits, fees and fines, and certain kinds of taxes. 
 
Yet despite these positive contributions, street traders continue to be treated with hostility and 
as encroachers. 
 
Street traders are a large and visible part of cities, but it is difficult to accurately measure their 
numbers. Data is available for some countries but one should be cautious when viewing this 
data as it may have underestimated the population involved in street trading and these numbers 
tend to fluctuate depending on the political and economic context in the country. 
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In Africa, street trading constitutes a large proportion of informal non-agricultural 
employment. For example; street vendors make up 19% in Dakar, Senegal; 19% in Cotonou, 
Benin; and 24% in Lomé, Togo (Herrera et al., 2012). In Asia and Latin America, street traders 
form a sizeable portion of the workforce: 11% in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam; and 
9% in Lima, Peru (Herrera et al., 2012). 
 
2.2.3. Trends in Governance 
Internationally, local authorities’ approach to the management of street trading has been 
‘ambivalent or repressive’ (Skinner, 2008:227). Urban authorities seldomly support or develop 
street traders. Across the world, they have continuously oppressed street traders, especially in 
inner cities (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:9). Street traders are either prohibited 
or severely restricted. How street traders are managed and treated varies across the world, some 
face large scale evictions, others harassment and a seldom few are included in urban planning 
(Skinner, 2008:8; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). There is currently no ‘best- 
practice’ when it comes to street trading policy and management, where there are victories they 
are often short lived as they face continuity problems. There is often a change in leadership or 
bureaucracy; a big event (e.g. World Cup) or an election that disrupts any progressive 
developments towards street trading. 
In Africa, the treatment of street vendors is very hostile and restrictive. In many African 
countries there are large scale evictions, harassment and violence (Tranberg Hansen & Vaa, 
2014:13; Skinner, 2008: 227). Street traders are dismissed as they are seen as ‘untidy, 
disruptive, and they are criminalised’ (Tranberg Hansen & Vaa, 2014:13; Skinner, 2008: 227). 
 
Overall, most cities adopt restrictive and repressive management approaches to street trading. 
There is poor management, legislation and planning around street trading and there is a lack of 
political imagination and innovation when it comes to urban planning and development – this 
is largely due to the pursuit of the world-class city status. The cities battle to balance urban 
planning and economic and social development without jeopardizing the livelihoods of the 
most socially vulnerable. 
 
Asia, particularly India and Thailand, are the only countries where street trading is widely and 
increasingly accepted as a permanent and positive characteristic of the urban city (Bénit- 
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Gbaffou, 2015:9; Skinner, 2008). Cities in these countries are progressive when it comes to the 
management of their street traders, they are consulted and included in key government policy 
that affect their livelihoods, and they enjoy an open and constructive relationship with officials. 
Durban, South Africa, was briefly progressive in its management of street traders. This was 
evident with the Warwick Junction Project which saw council officials, together with traders, 
spatially redesign the area and provide ‘an improved environment for commuters and 
infrastructure for many different trader groups’ (Skinner, 2009:104). 
 
There is increasing acknowledgement that street trading is here to stay, however this has not 
translated into practice. Instead, city governments are taking action against street trading 
through relocation projects, “clean sweeps” and the prohibition of street trading. 
 
2.2.3.1 Restrictive and Repressive Government Responses to Street Trading 
 
 
a. Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) 
Operation Murambatsvina (or the Operation was the largest and most violent eviction of street 
traders that took place in Africa. This operation took place in Zimbabwe in May 2005. The 
official translation of ‘murambatsvina’ is ‘clean-up’, but the literal Shona translation is ‘getting 
rid of the filth’ (United Nations, 2005; Skinner, 2008: 13) – this speaks volumes into the 
government’s attitude and approach towards street trading in the country. 
 
In the 1980s the informal economy in Zimbabwe was relatively small, it accounted for less 
than 10% of the labour force. This was due to a number of laws that prohibited free movement 
of people, especially from rural to urban areas (United Nations, 2005:17). Independence saw 
the significant growth of the informal economy to 40% in 2004, this was due to deregulation 
and the country’s ‘economic stagnation and decline’ (United Nations, 2005:17). The informal 
economy had become the main source of income for many Zimbabweans. In 2005, ILO 
reported that 3-4 million Zimbabweans earned their living through employment in the informal 
sector (United Nations, 2005:17). 
 
The growth of the informal economy; the urbanization crisis in the country; persistent budget 
cuts; high inflation; food and fuel shortages; foreign currency shortage; and the tense political 
environment gave breeding ground to what the government called Operation Murambatsvina. 
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The Operation was purported as a programme to enforce all by-laws in order to stop all forms 
of alleged ‘illegal activities in areas such as vending and illegal structures’ (Ukuthula Trust, 
2015). With little to no warning, this Operation began on the 26th   of May, 2005 and it involved 
the destruction of street trading activities through the demolition of informal business 
structures, trading bays and informal trading points – including those licensed (Ukuthula Trust, 
2015). The government justified its actions by stating that informal trading provided a hiding 
place for criminals. They also stated that the city had become chaotic and disorderly because 
of such activities. An estimated 700 000 people lost their homes, source of livelihood or both 
during Operation Murambatsvina (United Nations, 2005). 
 
Operation Murambatsvina highlights an intolerance towards street trading in cities and the 
existence of the informal economy as a whole. The government destroyed the livelihoods of 
hundreds of thousands in its repressive approach. What is astonishing is that this was taking 
place in the midst of an economic crisis where the government could not provide any jobs for 
the masses. 
 
b. Violent Evictions in Africa: Ghana and Zambia 
Although not on the scale of Operation Murambatsvina, there are other cases of widespread 
violent evictions, and harsh, restrictive measures of street trading across Africa. In April 1999, 
police, council workers and paramilitary destroyed market structures for street trading in 
Lusaka’s inner-city (Tranberg Hansen, 2004:66-67). This took place over several weeks and 
extended across the whole city into townships and residential areas (Tranberg Hansen, 
2004:66-67). ‘Similar operations took place on the Copperbelt and in the towns along the line- 
of-rail’ (Tranberg Hansen, 2004:66-67). Tranberg Hansen (2004:68) argues that these violent 
evictions were due to a leadership change in the local authority. A new mayor and council 
members had recently come into office in Lusaka and they were adamant on ‘cleaning up the 
capital’ (Tranberg Hansen, 2004:68). 
 
In Ghana, King (2006) found that the country’s new system of decentralization led to the 
violent eviction of street traders. The new system of decentralization allowed for more frequent 
changes in local authorities which led to the eviction of street traders. This is often seen as ‘a 
common way to impress the public’ (King, 2006:117). 
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The harsh, violent, restrictive and repressive management approach has dire consequences for 
the urban poor, especially in a context where there is high unemployment and poverty. Street 
trading and occupation in the informal economy is highly sought after in economic crises and 
rising unemployment. Cities should be supporting these efforts not destroying them. 
 
2.2.3.2.  Inclusive and Collaborative Management of Street Trading 
 
 
a. Inclusive and Participatory Planning: Warwick Junction 
‘…“Durban has provided an exhilarating proof of how poor people, in sensitive 
collaboration with urban planners, can enliven a city centre, generate employment for 




The inclusive and collaborative approach to managing street trading involves government 
officials consulting street traders in key policy decisions that may impact street traders’ 
livelihoods. The urban renewal project that took place in Warwick Junction is a great 
example of an inclusive and collaborative management approach to street trading. The 
eThekwini Municipality made a concerted effort to include street traders in the planning 
process. Traders described the planning process as very consultative and engaging, and traders 
were given the platform to voice their issues and they were included in multi-stakeholder 
committees and meetings (Horn, 2004:211). 
 
Traders and their organisations were consulted about the project at every level, and the 
Municipality went to great lengths to make sure that any concerns from the traders regarding 
the design or plan were dealt with (Skinner, 2008:235). At the construction level, traders were 
consulted and negotiations took place about the relocation of affected traders – but the planners 
ensured that where traders were relocated would be as financially viable (Dobson & Skinner, 
2009). There was open, clear and transparent communication between the Municipality and the 
traders regarding delays in construction, which maintained the trust between the different 
parties (Dobson & Skinner, 2009). 
 
Unfortunately, this victory was short-lived. The inclusive nature of the Municipality soon 
changed when a new city manager, Michael Sutcliffe, came into power. This revealed that how 
government deals with street trading is dependent on the vision and attitude of the person in 
power. Sutcliffe’s focus was on cleaning up the city, boosting economic growth and bringing 
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in investment (Horn, 2014:5-7), which was at the expense of street traders. He was a highly
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influential city manager who had both organisational and political power and influence, and 
used it to achieve his vision for the city. 
 
b. Progressive Policy Responses: India 
India is by far the most progressive and advanced when it comes to inclusive regulation of 
street vending and meaningful participation in policy-making processes that affect street 
vendors. The Town Vending Committees (TVCs) have been established after years of struggle 
by NASVI and SEWA for more inclusive regulation of street vending and meaningful 
participation in negotiations.  
 
Historically, there were no laws regulating street trading, even though 2.5% of the urban 
population engaged in this activity. Instead, street trading was viewed as illegal (Bhowmik, 
n.d.). Currently street vending is seen as an initiative for urban poverty alleviation; there is an 
emphasis on self-regulation; and through TVCs, street vendors have a say in policies that affect 
their livelihoods (Bhowmik, n.d.; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:32-36). Under the 2014 Indian Street 
Vendors Act (Protection of Livelihoods and Regulation of Street Vending), street traders are 
given great powers, which includes making recommendations to local authority about 
government policy around street trading (e.g. Street Vending Plan and the Street Vending 
Scheme). 
 
In Ahmedabad, the TVC has the following powers and functions (Grest, 2012) 
- making rules for the vending zones 
- locating the zones 
- deciding the density of vendors in each area 
- deciding the rules for registration of the vendors 
- deciding the methods for demarcating the vending zones 
- deciding the terms and conditions of vending 
- deciding the monitoring mechanism 
- engaging in dispute resolution between traders and traders organisations 
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2.2.3.3. Markets: An Effort to “Manage” Street Trading 
 
 
a. Market Upgrading and the Relocation of Traders – Hsinchu City, Taiwan 
The most common ways cities regulate street trading is through limiting the number of vendors 
through licenses and permits; allocating public spaces solely for street trading; and relocating 
street traders into public markets (Kim & Weng, 2016:48). Of these strategies, the most 
challenging one is moving street traders into markets. This is because the spatial locations and 
set up of these markets are not financially viable for traders’ livelihoods (Morales & Kettles, 
2009; Kim& Weng, 2016:48). The problem with public markets is that their locations are not 
easily accessible for customers and this negatively impacts on the traders’ profits. So many 
traders tend to reject the introduction of public markets. Secondly, public markets are subject 
to tighter regulation and the city officials are responsible for the allocation of space – which 
may not be favourable for the traders’ goods or services (Cross, 1998; Donovan, 2008; Kettles, 
2004; Morales, 2010; Kim & Weng, 2016:49). Lastly, markets open up opportunities for rent- 
seeking behaviour and this is a burden for traders. 
 
Relocation Process of the Zhu Lian (ZL) Street Traders 
Street traders started conducting their business in the late 1800s. By the late 1970s, an estimated 
500 street traders earned their living in the ZL street market (Kim & Weng, 2016:51). 
 
Roughly 2500 street traders were operating in Hsinchu before the relocation project (Taiwan, 
2003; Kim & Weng, 2016:50). 
 
The Hsinchu Street Vendors’ Union (HSVU) was formed in 1958. The main mission of the 
union was to protect the rights of its members by building a relationship between street vendors 
and the City government (Kim & Weng, 2016:51). The union now has more than 1000 vendors, 
of which 300 operate in the ZL public market and it enjoys a mutually beneficial relationship 
with the City. 
 
In 1986, the City Mayor planned to build a new four-story market that would accommodate 
500 booths, this market would be less than a block away from where the ZL vendors operated 
(Kim & Weng, 2016:52). The City had a difficult time attracting vendors to the market. 
Vendors were reluctant because they feared losing existing customers and they felt that foot 
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traffic would be low. The City decided to manage the market through a private-public 
partnership, and the tender was eventually awarded to the HSVU leaders. An agreement was 
made where the HSVU leaders would pay the City 200 000 USD annually for 9 years, and in 
return the City government would assist in helping the HSVU leaders to operate a successful 
public market. 
 
The HSVU was able to attract vendors to the market as the vendors tended to trust the HSVU 
leadership more than the City officials. HSVU has succeeded in managing the market through 
a collaboration with its members and the City government, and it restructured and leased out 
booths in a way that would benefit the vendors and attract customers (Kim & Weng, 2016:53). 
The ZL market building remains fully occupied and it is viewed as the most successful public 
market in Hsinchu City. 
 
This project highlights the advantages of city governments collaborating with street traders in 
regulating street trading in the inner city. It also highlights the advantages of allowing markets 
to be managed by street trader organisations instead of private companies or government, who 
do not know what the traders need in order to succeed and they tend to establish rent-seeking 
opportunities in these spaces. In these cases, it is important for government to play a 
collaborative and supportive role in order to empower street traders. What worked to the 
advantage of HSVU is that they had a long standing relationship with the government and that 
the government was open to collaborating with the union. The government also understood 
that allowing the union to self-manage the market would give them a sense of ownership and 
an incentive for the market’s success. This project also highlights the challenges in relocating 
street traders to markets. 
 
2.2.4. Trends in Policy and Legislation 
Globally, trends in governance reveal that most countries do not have national level policies 
and regulations that govern informal work – where they exist they are vague and leave the 
interpretation open to local government. India is currently the only country in the world that 
has a national policy on informal work. 
 
Street vending is controversial in cities globally. Urban policies and local economic 
development strategies rarely prioritize the livelihood of informal workers. Urban renewal 
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projects, infrastructure upgrades and mega events (such as World Cups) always remove street 
vendors from natural markets. Many cities go through cycles of tolerance, regulation and 
eviction depending on election cycles, economic trends and urban management pressures 
(Chen et al., 2001; Chen, 2012; Skinner, 2009). At the heart of the controversy is conflict over 
land and urban space; access to the city; and the pursuit of world-class city status which euro- 
centrically determines what is formal and informal. 
 
2.2.4.1. No Friends of Street Traders: World-Class Cities 
Informality is not seen as a characteristic of a world-class city. Cities are very intentional about 
eliminating any form of informality, especially in the urban centres, in order to attract 
investment and be seen as a world-class city. This does not bode well for “informal” activities 
such as street trading. 
 
It is not very clear how world cities are identified and ordered. The birth of the concept can be 
traced back to 1915 (Rogerson, 2004a:12). The term is attributed to Sir Patrick Geddes, who 
published a chapter on world-class cities and city regions (Rogerson, 2004a:12). The concept 
was later reintroduced by Peter Hall in 1966, he characterised world cities as cities where ‘the 
world’s most important business is conducted’ (Hall, 1996). Later in 1986, John Friedmann 
characterised world cities as cities where there was advanced, managed and practiced corporate 
management, banking, financing, legal services, telecommunications, computing, research and 
higher education (Rogerson, 2004a:14). 
 
This concept has been met by great criticism. Many argue that this concept has led to a process 
of emulation, which misses diversity and forces uniformity. Robinson (2002) argues that the 
notions of global and world cities ‘impose substantial limitations on imagining and planning 
the futures of cities around the world’ – it stifles innovation when it comes to urban planning 
and development. He further argues that many cities who do not qualify as world-class cities 
are caught within a limited view and understanding of development. He then focuses on cities 
in developing countries, where this pursuit of attaining world-class status causes tension and 
an imbalance between finding a way to fit into globalization and emulating the success of a 
small number of cities, and achieving developmental initiatives that aim to tackle and address 
poverty, unemployment, inequality and service delivery (Robinson, 2002). The pursuit of 
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world-class status always comes at the expense of the poor and vulnerable. This is evident in 
the City of Johannesburg. 
 
The problem with the concept of world-class city is that it promotes a modernist approach to 
urban planning which rejects informality (Skinner, 2009:101). This modernist approach sees 
modern and world-class cities as orderly, clean, hygienic, and formal (Skinner, 2009:108). This 
is often seen as necessary in order to attract investment, compete globally and attain world- 
class city status. 
 
In November 2007, StreetNet International launched its World Class Cities for All campaign 
in Johannesburg to challenge the traditional approach to building world-class cities. StreetNet 
International is an international alliance of street vendors launched in Durban, South Africa in 
November 2002 (StreetNet). The World Class Cities for All advocated for a more inclusive 
notion that encouraged the participation of the urban poor, including street vendors. The urban 
poor are always the first to lose their livelihoods and they are the first to be ignored when it 
comes to plans for “World-Class Cities” as they do not fit into the what the city envisions to 
be a “World-Class City”. 
 
What is interesting is that existing world-class cities have street trading, the only difference is 
that they have successfully incorporated it into the city. Street trading can be included in the 
notion of world-class city, it is all about how it is incorporated and managed by the city. 
 
2.3. Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on the informal economy and street trading. The first 
section looked at the definitions, the history, size and significance of the informal economy. It 
highlighted the large and heterogenous character of the economy, its link to the formal 
economy and the fact that there is no single causal theory that explains the existence of the 
informal economy. It then narrowed its focus on street trading: discussing definitions, the size, 
significance of street trading; and the trends evident in governance and policy when it comes 
to the regulation of street trading. It highlighted that internationally, local government tends to 
be restrictive in its regulation of street trading, and that many countries lack a national policy 
that regulates informal work – India is the only country that has such a policy. The chapter also 
highlighted what is at the heart of the conflict and challenge in managing street trading in cities 
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– access to land and urban space; and the pursuit of the world-class city status which rejects 
informality. Cities are battling to balance urban planning and economic development, with 
poverty alleviation and social development. The former tends to get more attention at the 
expense of the latter. 
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This chapter looks at street trading and the informal economy in South Africa. It begins by 
looking at the size and significance of the informal economy in the country, and then it 
highlights the trends and characteristics of street trading in inner-cities. The national legislation 
and framework that regulates street trading is discussed and then the last section discusses the 
history of government approaches to street trading in South Africa with specific reference to 
Johannesburg. 
 
3.1. The Informal Economy in South Africa: Size and Significance 
 
 
“The emergence of the informal economy in South Africa stems from its apartheid history of 




The informal sector in South Africa can be understood from a structuralist and dualistic 
perspective. The structuralist school of thought is valuable because it recognizes the link 
between the informal and formal economy. The dualist school of thought is applicable because: 
it recognizes that the informal economy provides income and employment for the vulnerable 
and poor in the country; it recognizes that it exists because of the inability of the formal 
economy to create employment; and it recognizes that a majority of the population cannot be 
absorbed by the formal economy because they lack the skills that are required, as the South 
African economy is a modern economy driven by knowledge, research and development 
(Rogerson, 2004b; Skinner, 2008). Despite the continuous increase in the size of the informal 
economy in South Africa, its significance and contribution in the country continues to be 
underestimated and overlooked. Government is aware that the informal economy is important 
for job creation and poverty reduction but there is still little support for those in the informal 
economy. 
 
This can largely be blamed on former President Thabo Mbeki’s conceptualisation of the 
informal economy. In his 2003 State of the Nation address he presented the notion of the ‘dual 
economy’. He argued that South Africa’s economy is split into two, the ‘first’ economy, being 
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the formal economy, and the ‘second’ economy, being the informal economy. Mbeki stated 
that this second economy consists of a large percentage of the population, and is characterised 
by marginalisation, poverty, under-development, little contribution to the GDP, the poorest of 
the poor, unemployment, incapability of self-generated growth and development (Devey et al., 
2006: 224-243). He further argued that there is no relationship between the two and that the 
two operate parallelly. 
 
He held the strong belief that to deal with the issue of underdevelopment, poverty and 
unemployment in the country, growth in the first economy needed to be enhanced and 
encouraged (Devey et al., 2006: 224-243). According to his logic, this would result in job 
creation and address the challenges of the second economy, and eventually absorb the second 
economy (Devey et al., 2006: 224-243). The former President did not fully acknowledge the 
significance of the informal economy and the contribution it has made towards job creation 
and poverty alleviation. He failed to recognize that the formal economy cannot solely deal with 
the challenges of poverty and unemployment. Unfortunately this view has negatively 
influenced government policy and interventions in the informal economy, government 
continues to treat the informal economy as a problem and it continues to view it as something 
that is not permanent, and something that will eventually disappear instead of tapping into its 
potential (Devey et al., 2006: 224-243). Devey et al. (2006: 224-243) argue that ‘government 
policy for the second economy is often either absent, or ineffective or piecemeal.’ 
 
3.1.1. Significance of Informal Sector, specifically Street Trading 
Statistics South Africa’s 2016 Quarterly Labour Force Survey found that 2 565 000 South 
Africans work in the informal sector (2016:vi; Rogan & Skinner, 2017). That means 16.4% of 
total employment in South Africa is found in the informal sector. 1 015 600 of those 2 565 000 
South Africans in the informal sector are informal traders, that is 40, 5% of the informal sector 
(Statistics South Africa, 2016:vi; Rogan & Skinner, 2017). It was also found that Informal 
trading makes a 5.2% contribution to the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Statistics 
South Africa, 2015). It is important to note that this excludes foreign traders, which make a 
great percentage of informal traders. This is due to the fact that foreign migrants are not well 
documented in the country. 
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There are several reasons why street trading is significant: 
• Street Trading has generated employment and served as a safety net for hundreds of 
thousands of South Africans and foreigners in South Africa – it provides a livelihood 
for many who have dependents to support (Devey et al., 2006; Rogerson, 2015; 
Skinner, 2008). 
• It plays a great role in distributing cheaper goods in appropriate quantities to poorer 
South Africans and it has played a positive role in food security (Skinner, 2008). 
• Street trading contributes to the generation of local revenues as street traders have to 
pay for trading licenses, registration, permits and rent (Skinner, 2008). 
• Street trading enhances the chain of distribution for goods and services. 
 
• Street trading plays a role in strengthening the links between the formal and informal 
sector through the purchasing and sourcing of goods from formal enterprises and 
wholesalers (Skinner, 2008). 
Street trading in South Africa is acknowledged as being vital yet this is not reflected in 
government policy and practice, there is very little support for street traders and there is little 
investment in their development. 
 
3.2. Legislation surrounding Informal Trading in South Africa 
 
 
3.2.1. The Constitution 
The Constitution has empowered local government to develop policy and legislation to manage 
street trading. Section 152 of the Constitution sets out the objectives of local government which 
include; providing democratic and accountable government to local communities; ensuring the 
delivery of services to communities in a sustainable manner; promoting social and economic 
development; promoting a safe and healthy environment; and encouraging the involvement of 
communities and community organisations in the matters of local government. Section 156 of 
the Constitution highlights the powers and functions of municipalities – one of them being 
street trading which is listed in Part B of Schedule 5. Municipalities therefore have the mandate 
and power to draw up street trading by-laws. Under section 162, municipalities are 
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required to ensure community and stakeholder participation, engagement and consultation 
before enforcing any legislation through publishing draft legislation in the relevant provincial 
gazette and allowing submissions from the public. These sections are given effect by the 
Municipal Systems Act which highlights municipal duties; powers and functions; the 
municipal drafting of by-laws; and the importance of community participation. 
 
The Constitution has also empowered citizens, specifically street traders in this context, 
through the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights outlines the rights of all citizens in South Africa 
and is there to protect those rights from being infringed upon or violated by any public officials 
and/or private citizens. The government is responsible for upholding those rights, protecting 
them and promoting them. We will only focus on five rights which are directly relevant to 
street traders, their livelihoods and their treatment by the City: the right to dignity, the right to 
equality, the freedom of trade; property rights; and just administrative action. 
 
• Section 9(1): everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law. This right is relevant to the treatment and lived-experiences of street 
traders. 
• Section 10: everyone has the right to ‘inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity 
respected and protected’. This right is relevant to the treatment and lived-experiences 
of street traders. 
• Section 22: ‘everyone has the right to choose their trade and occupation or profession’ 
but this right is subject to regulation by the relevant authorities. 
• Section 25(1): prohibits ‘arbitrary deprivation of property’ (it is important to note that 
property is not only limited to land Section 25(4)(b)). One of the problems that street 
traders constantly face is the confiscation of their goods by police officials, without the 
officials following due process such as providing a receipt of the confiscated goods. 
• Section 33(1): ‘everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable 
and procedurally fair’. Section 33(2) further states that ‘everyone whose rights have 
been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be given written 
reasons’. This is relevant to decisions taken by City officials with regards to which 
areas are demarcated as restricted or prohibited for street trading. 
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The City has been guilty of violating all the above rights in its management of street trading 
and the treatment of street traders in the inner-city of Johannesburg. It has, and to some extent 
continues to fail to respect, uphold, protect and promote these Bill of Rights. This will be 
discussed further in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
 
3.2.2. Businesses Act 
Street trading in South Africa is regulated and managed by municipal by-laws and policy at the 
local government level. Street trading is recognized in the Businesses Act 71 of 1991. The Act 
formally recognizes street vendors as business people. This Act is significant as it changed the 
government’s attitude towards street trading, it brought about the deregulation of street trading 
and removed many barriers of entry. It brought about a shift in the government’s policy and 
legislation around street trading – previously street trading was prohibited and it was 
characterised by ‘repression, persecution and prosecution’ (Beavon & Rogerson, 1986; 
Rogerson & Hart, 1989:32; Lund & Skinner, 2004; Rogerson, 2015:206). In this Act the 
government acknowledges that street trading is to a large extent a product of apartheid and the 
injustices of the past, therefore it recognizes the need to support it. It also recognizes the 
significance and contribution it makes to the economy. Unfortunately this has not adequately 
translated into policy and practice. 
 
The Businesses Act deals with licensing issues, appeals, penalties, parameters for regulation, 
the powers and limitations of local authorities, and the selling of goods. In 1993, there was an 
amendment to the Businesses Act. The Businesses Amendment Act 186 of 1993, gave 
municipalities the mandate to draw up and implement by-laws regarding street trading in South 
Africa – it allowed local authorities to outline what they would and would not allow in their 
municipality, and to declare restricted and prohibited trading zones. The amendment gave local 
authorities greater autonomy to manage street trading and as a result different authorities have 
adopted different management approaches. However, Municipal by-laws must be in 
accordance with Section 6A of the Act which states that as much as the municipality has the 
authority to prohibit and restrict trading in certain areas, they must first consider the effects 
that that would have on the livelihoods of the street traders operating in that given area. The 
COJ failed to uphold Section 6A and it continuously contravenes this Section through the 
JMPD’s repressive and corrupt enforcement methods. 
 
In 1995, the authority to amend the Act was devolved to provincial government. 
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3.3. History of Street Trading in South Africa 
“Until the early 1980s traders in South Africa were subject to a well-entrenched tradition of 
repression, persecution and prosecution” 
(Rogerson & Hart, 1989:32) 
 
 
During the apartheid years, street traders were subject to severe, repressive policies. These 
policies led to the forced, often brutal, removal of mainly poor black street traders seeking to 
occupy trading spaces in central areas of the country - which were predominantly white 
(Beavon & Rogerson, 1986; Rogerson, 1986). The democratic transition however, saw the 
emergence of a more tolerant policy environment in major cities such as Johannesburg, Durban 
and Cape Town. 
 
Throughout history - under colonialism and apartheid - policies were designed to intentionally 
eliminate street trading and make it near impossible to trade in the city centers and tourist areas. 
This was because street trading was associated with chaos, crime and grime. The apartheid 
state’s ‘complex web of national and local laws’ made it almost impossible to trade on the 
streets (Skinner, 2008:14). The Urban Areas Act of 1923 was characterized by residential 
segregation; influx control; the prohibition of black people in urban areas; and restriction on 
the nature and location of commercial activity for black people (Beavon, 2004: 188-189). It is 
important to understand that throughout history, black people were intentionally, legally and 
racially excluded from participating in the formal economy, and their freedom of movement 
and participation in commercial activity was curtailed (Beavon & Rogerson, 1986). This led 
black people to seek opportunities in the informal economy. The Urban Areas Act vaguely 
defined and permitted street trading, it was the only legitimate pass to remain and work in urban 
areas for black people (Beavon, 2004:188-189). Even though street trading was allowed, the 
cities made it near impossible to trade and trading was characterized by harassment. The 
municipal by-laws were strictly and repressively enforced and made it difficult for traders to 
operate. Cities adopted laws such as the ‘Move-On’ law, which required street traders to move 
their trading stand by 25 meters every 20 minutes, this made trading exceedingly difficult for 
traders (Beavon, 2004: 188-189). Street traders who did not abide to the by-laws were 
constantly harassed, fined and removed, and their goods were often confiscated. Other tactics 
that were used to eliminate and repress street trading were limiting the number of licenses 
issued, especially to black people – Indians were more likely to get licenses compared to black 
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people (Rogerson & Hart, 1989; Beavon, 2004:188-190). Access to urban space in the inner- 
city was limited but despite this street traders continued to trade and were not deterred by the 
constant harassment and confiscation of goods (Rogerson & Hart, 1989). Rogerson and Hart 
(1989:32) aptly argue that the South African apartheid government ‘fashioned and refined 
some of the most sophisticated sets of anti-street trader measures found anywhere in the 
developing world’. 
 
During the mid-1980s, influx control laws became less enforceable due to rapid urbanization 
and migration into metropolitan areas that took place from the late 1970s and 1980s (Todes, 
2001; Beavon, 1989), as a result these laws were repealed in 1986. Apartheid also became more 
difficult to maintain due to several factors such as rising resistance and the imposition of 
sanctions against the apartheid regime (Luus & Krugell, 2005), this eventually led to the 
collapse of apartheid. 
 
The end of apartheid came with several changes. The 1990s saw the restructuring of the 
economy to reintegrate into the global economy, this resulted in the deregulation of the formal 
economy and a rapid increase in the informal economy. Declines were experienced in key 
sectors such as mining and agriculture, which were key sectors for employment. Although the 
economy was growing, jobless growth was taking place and the formal economy was unable 
to create enough jobs for the population, especially for the previously disadvantaged, 
economically excluded, unskilled and uneducated black majority. This continues to be a 
challenge today and as a result South Africa continues to see an increase in its informal 
economy. 
 
The deregulation of the economy and the democratic transition saw the rapid expansion of the 
informal economy, especially within central business districts (CBDs) of urban areas which 
were previously white spaces. This led to ‘white flight’ or ‘capital flight’ (Beavon, 2004:211- 
212; Beall et al., 2002: 111; Holness et al., 1999; Todes, 2001; Luus & Krugell, 2005). The 
increasing number of informal businesses and the increase in street trading in these urban 
spaces resulted in some formal businesses moving to suburban areas. These formal businesses 
left with their market - high income whites. This period of ‘capital flight’ led to the 
‘proliferation of neglected and crumbling urban environments, exacerbated by the lack of 
facilities, services and a dwindling tax base in the inner city’ (Dobson & Skinner, 2009). Many 
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local authorities responded to this by establishing ‘inner-city regeneration’ programmes to 
revitalize and clean up the city and draw in investment back into the inner-city. 
 
A detrimental feature of these programmes is the adoption of City Improvement Districts 
(CIDs) and the relocation of traders into markets. CIDs can be defined as: 
 
‘a geographic area within which property owners agree to pay for certain services to 
enhance the physical and social environment of the area. The services provided are 
supplementary to those provided by the local authority and usually include safety and 
security patrol officers, pavement cleaning, litter collection, maintenance of public 
space and the removal of illegal posters’ (CJP) 
 
CIDs are based on former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s mid-1980’s strategy for local 
economic development and urban renewal. His strategy has been adopted world-wide and is 
mostly evident in South Africa in the cities of Johannesburg and Cape Town (CJP). Once 51 
percent or more of the area’s property owners have voted to adopt a CID, all owners in that 
area must participate. They must pay additional fees which are added to their municipal bills 
and collected by the City (CJP). Each CID has its own board of directors which control the 
district, the board is comprised of property owners and business-people (whose voting power 
is proportional to their levy contribution), with no necessary representation from tenants or 
those trading on the streets in the area (CJP). The board then appoints an urban specialist 
company to manage the day-to-day operations in the CID. In Johannesburg CIDs are managed 
by the CJP – which facilitates and manages partnerships between business and the local 
authority – and an urban management company Urban Genesis Management. CIDs tend to 
prohibit or highly restrict street trading to avoid urban decay. 
 
3.3.1. History of Street Trading in Johannesburg 
In 1922 the Johannesburg Council created restricted areas which protected white urban space 
(Beavon, 2004:187-189). 23 blocks in the CBD were demarcated for street trading with only a 
few fixed stands for black traders – mainly Indians. The number of street blocks were later 
expanded in 1947, 1948, and again in 1953. By 1953 there were 192 blocks demarcated for 
street trading, most of them were in the downtown area and parts of the residential zone around 
Joubert Park (Beavon, 2004:187-189). Traders were only allowed to access these areas before 
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7am and after 6pm, and those operating outside the demarcated zones were required to adhere 
to the ‘Move-On’ policy thus making it difficult to trade in the city (Beavon, 2004:187-189). 
During these years of segregation and grand apartheid there were very few ‘hawkers’ (the 
derogatory term for street traders is intentionally used to aptly capture the attitude towards 
street traders under apartheid) operating in the CBD, the City made sure of that. Thus, the 
apartheid era severely restricted the freedom of movement of black South Africans into and 
within urban areas, as well as their freedom of entry and participation in the formal economy 
(Beavon, 2004:187-189; Rogerson & Hart, 1989:32). Furthermore, during the height of grand 
apartheid, from 1948 to 1983, the inner City of Johannesburg was effectively segregated and 
zoned for white residential and commercial activity (Beavon, 2004:187-189). 
 
By 1979, despite the harsh and restrictive measures put in place by the government officials 
there were several hawkers operating in the inner-city, on the periphery of the demarcated areas 
in the CBD, and a few hawkers trading from fixed stands inside the demarcated areas (Beavon, 
2004: 190). The 1980s, however, saw the deregulation of street trading. The 1979 Hawker 
Report and the National Manpower, Wihahn and Riekert Commissions in the 1980s paved the 
way for a relaxed, less restrictive and repressive approach to street trading (Beavon, 2004: 190 
-210). This was due to the declining economy, as a result government decided to encourage the 
informal sector and small businesses. By the end of the 1980s there were about 14 000 legal 
traders working in municipal Johannesburg (Beavon, 2004:211). 
 
As previously mentioned, the 1990s saw the massive expansion of the informal economy. As 
influx controls were lifted, more people were moving into cities with the hopes of finding work, 
many resorted to street trading as the formal economy had become saturated (Beavon, 
2004:210-212; Beall et al., 2002:111). As a result, the number of licensed and unlicensed 
traders increased rapidly in the CBD and it became more difficult for the police to manage this 
new situation (Beavon, 2004: 211-212). Increasing informality in the CBD created great 
tension between formal businesses and street traders. Congestion on the narrow pavements, 
and an escalation in petty crime on the streets led to white residents moving to the suburbs 
(Beavon, 2004:211-212; Beall et al., 2002:111). Simultaneously, due to escalating political 
turmoil and violence, office-based activity occurring in the CBD – such as financial companies, 
corporations, small businesses, individual professionals and medical practitioners - were 
moving to the northern suburbs of Johannesburg, particularly Sandton, Rosebank and Midrand 
38  
(Beavon, 2004:211-212; Beall et al., 2002: 111). This was due to desegregation, after the 
passing of the Businesses Act in 1991 Johannesburg’s inner-city became one of the most 
racially integrated areas in South Africa (Beavon, 2004:212). As more black people came in 
and occupied the space, more white people left the space, leaving with their businesses and 
high income. Unfortunately, the rapid increase in desegregation became synonymous with 
slum living, poverty, crime and grime, and urban decay (Beavon, 2004:212). And 
Johannesburg’s inner-city – CBD, Braamfontein, Hillbrow, Berea, Joubert Park, Yeoville and 
Bellevue - soon became labelled as a no-go area characterized by general chaos and unruliness 
(Beavon, 2004:212). 
 
By 2000, the degree of inner-city decay prompted a response by the City. In its 2001 “Inner 
City Position Paper”, it stated that there was a need to “turn the inner city around” (Tissington, 
2009). The City therefore begun to identify the inner-city as a priority area for urban renewal. 
To reverse inner-city decline, inner-city renewal and regeneration was declared as one of six 
mayoral priorities in the COJ. 
 
In 2002, Joburg 2030 was launched. Joburg 2030 is a long-term economic vision for the City 
of Johannesburg. It is aimed at boosting investment and raising economic growth to turn 
Johannesburg into a “world-class African city”. This had and continues to have major 
implications for street traders in the City. Throughout the launch of this economic vision, 
various government officials criticized street traders and blamed them for the capital flight, 
office vacancies, depressed rentals and inner-city decay (Tissington, 2009:29). 
 
The City focused on partnering with business to clean up the city and draw in investment, this 
was done through the establishment of CIDs. Business interests and local authority interests 
were closely aligned and at the center of CIDs. This led to street traders being excluded from 
decision-making processes and forums that affected their livelihoods. This highlights the core 
challenge of urban renewal and inner-city regeneration, which is achieving economic 
development without marginalizing or excluding the poor: 
 
“For urban regeneration to be successful it must run concurrently with economic 
transformation of the people who live in the specific area and should not be narrowed 
down to a private-sector “owned” process specifically designed to improve their 
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property values at the expense of the poor… The real challenge of how to successfully 
integrate urban regeneration with economic development and empowerment of people 
needs to be faced head on.” (SANTRA, 2007:3 cited in Tissington, 2009:30) 
 
Unfortunately, the balance is never achieved. In world class cities, private interests are 
always prioritized over the poor and marginalized. This is evident with the City of 
Johannesburg, as it always prioritizes investment and achieving world-class city status to the 
detriment of the poor and vulnerable. This will be discussed further in Chapters 4, 5 & 6. 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the informal economy and street trading in South Africa. It looked at 
the size and significance of the informal economy in the country and highlighted major trends 
and characteristics of street trading in urban city centers. It then looked at the legislative 
framework for street trading and lastly, it looked at the historical background and context of 
street trading in South Africa, with a focus on Johannesburg, in relation to government 
approaches. 
40  
Chapter 4: Institutional Framework and Management of Street Trading in 
Johannesburg 
 
“…the state does its job badly – ranging from poor regulation to oppressive or 
exclusionary measures…” (World Bank, 2007:23) 
 
4.0. Introduction 
This chapter will look at the institutional framework and management model for street trading 
in the inner-city of Johannesburg. It will first look at the institutional location of street trading 
over the past few years in South Africa and highlight the importance of where street trading is 
located. Then it will critically look at the department and various entities responsible for 
managing street trading. Lastly, spaces for participation will be discussed with specific 
relevance to street trading organisations and their ability to influence policy around street 
trading in the inner-city. 
 
4.1. Institutional Framework and Management of Street Trading in Johannesburg 
The institutional location of street trading is particularly important as it requires consistent and 
comprehensive collaboration and coordination across multiple departments – it is the only way 
effective and efficient management can be achieved. It requires the involvement of the 
departments of Planning, Urban Management, Health and Safety, Transport and investment 
agencies. 
 
The institutional location of street trading in South Africa has shifted over the past number of 
years. During apartheid it was located under municipal police departments, which focused on 
the control and repression of illegal trading, and the traffic department (Rogerson, 1988; 
Skinner, 2010). Post-apartheid saw the relocation of street trading to Business/Economic 
Development units and departments which were within metropolitan councils – this was done 
to achieve a more developmental approach to street trading (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:57). 
 
In the COJ, street trading is in the DED. The management of street trading, however, has been 
delegated to municipal owned enterprises (MOEs) and it is quite fragmented. 
In an effort to save the City from a fiscal crisis and to reverse the decline of the inner-city, the 
COJ introduced iGoli in the early 2000s. IGoli was a restructuring programme aimed at dealing 
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with the 1997 fiscal crisis the City was faced with, this crisis was due to rampant capital 
expenditure, capital flight and poor payment levels (Cameron, n.d.:8). IGoli made provision 
for the establishment of MOEs. MOEs were hoped to achieve more efficient and effective 
service delivery. These MOEs included the Metropolitan Trading Company (MTC), the 
Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP), the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) and 
the Johannesburg Property Company (JPC). 
 
The MTC (now the JPC) and the CJP are tasked with managing street trading in the inner-city, 
they are each responsible for various trading sites and markets. They work together with the 
JDA and private sector to manage these various sites. The Johannesburg Metropolitan Police 
Department (JMPD) is tasked with enforcing the street trading by-laws, which regulate trading 
in the inner city. Street trading in Johannesburg’s inner-city is therefore managed publicly (JPA 
and JMPD) and privately (CJP). 
 
4.1.1. Public Management of Street Trade 
4.1.1.1. Department of Economic Development 
The City of Johannesburg established an Informal Trading Unit in 2017. There is a Director 
of Informal Trading who must report directly to the Executive Director of Economic 
Development. 
 
The DED handles drawing up and implementing the City’s Informal Trading Policy (ITP) and 
establishing and implementing the City’s Informal Trading By-Laws. Currently there is no 
Informal Trading Policy as the City was ordered to rework their policy to establish a more 
developmental and supportive approach to informal trading in the inner-city, post-Operation 
Clean Sweep (Constitutional Court, 2013). The Informal Trading Policy was meant to be 
promulgated this year, but the City has run into several complications, it cites management 
issues as the main challenge in promulgating the new policy. No further explanation was 
provided to clarify this. The City hopes to have an ITP by June 2019. Currently, the City has 
an ITP background document which highlights the key features it hopes to achieve in its new 
ITP. According to the document: 
 
“For the City of Johannesburg, informal trading is a positive development in the micro 
business sector as it contributes to the creation of jobs and alleviation of poverty and 
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has the potential to expand further the City’s economic base. The City of Johannesburg 
is working towards a well-managed and supported diverse informal trading sector 
which is effectively integrated into the developmental goals of the City.” (COJ, 2018:1) 
 
According to the DED (2018:2-5), the policy seeks to: 
 
 
• Define an integrated and holistic approach to informal trading for all of the COJ’s 
departments and MOEs; 
• Clarify the COJ's position and approach to informal trading to all relevant and interested 
stakeholders; 
• Form the basis for the review and revision of by-laws that regulate informal trading 
falling within the jurisdictional areas of the COJ; 
• Provide a framework for the development and resourcing of informal trading and 
informal traders; 
• Outline an approach towards the planning and management of informal trading; 
• Establish a framework for the monitoring and evaluation of informal trading; 
• Establish a policy framework for law enforcement. 
 
MTC previously served as the DED’s implementing arm in managing street trading markets 
and taxi ranks. MTC was later replaced by the JPC due to several management issues and 
confusion around its mandate. The JPC is currently responsible for managing street trading. 
 
4.1.1.2. Metropolitan Trading Company 
The MTC was established in 1999. The MTC was envisioned as a profit-driven company 
whose mandate was the management, marketing, business development, and maintenance of 
informal trading markets – located in taxi ranks – and later linear markets (Bénit-Gbaffou, 
2015:58; Tissington, 2009:39). The MTC was to be accountable to the DED. The MTC had 12 
trader markets and taxi ranks under its control. These included the City’s various street trading 
sites in the inner city and markets in Hillbrow, Yeoville, and the Faraday market and Metro 
Mall (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:58; Tissington, 2009:39). 
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The MTC handled the administrative management of street trading through supplying smart 
cards; allocating trading stalls and issuing lease agreements. According to Elliot Dubasi and his 
colleagues, the MTC was very inefficient and ineffective in doing so. 
 
a. Smart Cards 
The 2009 Informal Trading Policy mandated the MTC with the responsibility of issuing smart 
cards to street traders. There were inconsistencies in what the policy aimed to achieve and what 
was implemented by MTC. The smart card system was meant to be implemented and 
completed in 2007, but the system remains incomplete (Tissington, 2009:21; SERI, 2015:24; 
Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). 
 
The purpose of the smart card is to help the City manage traders. The smart card provides the 
biographical information of traders; identifies goods and services sold and provided by traders; 
it indicates the trader’s location and stall; and it states the rent the trader must pay per month. 
The smart card proves the legality of street traders and gives them the right and access to the 
City. Therefore, it is particularly important for street traders as it provides bureaucratic 
protection. 
 
The overall process has been slow, this is due to the complexity of the process. The City aimed 
to have everything done electronically but this has proved to be a challenge as the MTC lacked 
the capacity and systems needed to implement such a process (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015; SERI, 
2015). Traders also complained that the application process was lengthy, confusing, daunting 
and inaccessible. The City did not have information sessions to explain the application process 
or the application, which prevented traders from applying. 
 
The poor roll out of smart cards is a problem because it makes traders vulnerable to police 
harassment. What is concerning is that even traders who have smart cards still experienced 
some sort of police harassment. The poor roll out of smart cards fosters corruption, especially 
amongst JMPD officials. Many traders have complained of having to pay bribes to the JMPD 
to prevent being forcefully removed from their trading area, arrested or fined for trading 
illegally. 
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Following Operation Clean Sweep, the City restarted the entire process of the registration of 
street traders. The process now comprises of: 
 
1. A survey determining the number of existing traders. Whilst I was doing 
research, surveys were still being conducted by the Informal Trading Unit. 
2. Street traders’ application for stalls and verification lists 
3. Generating the final allocation list and allocating trading spaces 
4. Issuing smart cards 
5. Monitoring and evaluating implementation 
 
 
The problem is the Department has not successfully procured the smart card system and street 
traders are currently operating with no smart cards which leaves them vulnerable to police 
harassment and corruption. All processes were put on hold when Operation Clean Sweep took 
place and many processes that should have been completed and implemented in 2016, such as 
the smart card system, are still incomplete and underway. 
 
b. Stall Allocation 
The MTC was also responsible for allocating stalls, managing lease agreements and collecting 
rent. According to the 2009 policy, traders first needed to be issued a smart card and then 
allocated a trading stall, the allocation was meant to follow a ‘one-trader-one-stall’ principle. 
And allocation was meant to be done according to the goods and services traded; the projected 
income of the trader; and any traders who experienced displacement in the past were 
prioritized. But this did not translate into practice, instead allocation takes place informally, it 
is clientelistic and traders - both licensed and unlicensed - pay bribes to JMPD officials or block 
leaders to obtain stalls or trading sites. This leads to traders without smart cards having trading 
stalls and traders with smart cards not having trading stalls. Trading sites are also passed down 
the family line, something the City is unaware of (SERI, 2015:24). This shows how out of 
touch the City is to what is happening on the ground, traders’ lived realities do not inform 
policy. The JMPD exacerbates this situation by illegally allocating trading sites to unlicensed 
traders in front of trading stalls of licensed traders. Block leaders are also guilty of contributing 
to the mismanagement of stall allocation as they are very clientelistic and corrupt in their 
allocation of trading sites. This mismanagement and corruption cause conflict and tension 
between the traders. 
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c. Lease Agreements 
Many traders pay rent but are unaware of whether they have signed a lease agreement or not 
(SERI, 2015 :26-27). They are also unaware of the purpose and specifics of the lease 
agreements. Block leaders and officials tend to pressure traders into signing their agreements 
without knowing the specifics, block leaders threaten traders and state that they will lose their 
trading sites if they do not sign the lease agreement (SERI, 2015:26-27). 
 
Traders complain about the inaccessibility of the lease agreement as it is in English and uses 
extensive legal jargon, and the City has made no effort to fix this or go through the lease 
agreement with the traders (SERI, 2015:26-27). 
 
An important clause that was in the 2009 policy regarding the lease agreement is that the rent 
paid by traders should consider the services and infrastructure available to the traders. Many 
traders complain that they receive no services and that there is a lack of infrastructure to deal 
with the challenges of street trading. Many traders boycott paying because they do not receive 
basic services and infrastructure such as storage facilities; ablution services; water; waste 
disposal and refuse bins (SERI, 2015:26-27). There are no storage facilities for many traders, 
traders have to make their own arrangements with business and/or property owners close to 
their stall to store their goods at a monthly rate (SERI, :26-27). There is also a lack of proper 
infrastructure to serve as shelter in instances of harsh weather. Ablution services are not 
provided for many traders, traders must walk a couple of blocks to find public toilets and they 
usually must pay R2 to use these toilets (SERI, 2015 :26-27). Traders also complain about 
drainage problems, a lack of waste disposal and refuse bins. Trading areas need on-going 
maintenance and repair by multiple City departments, but this is not being done. What is 
interesting is that the City blames street traders for the grime, disorderliness and filth in the 
inner-city, when it is the City’s fault – it is not providing the services and infrastructure needed 
to support and manage street trading. 
 
d. Markets (including linear markets) 
The City naively hoped to move all street traders into markets and get rid of street trading in 
the inner-city to deal with the chaos and filth of street trading. This was naïve because 
international research has shown that moving street traders into markets never works as it 
negatively impacts business since there is lower pedestrian flow and new traders appear outside 
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the markets. Traders interviewed have complained about their experiences in the Metro Mall 
and Yeoville market - they have complained about the lack of foot traffic and certain parts of 
the markets being bad for business; and competition with traders outside the markets 
(Tissington, 2009:39; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). Markets have overall been described as white 
elephants due to their lack of foot traffic (Tissington, 2009:39; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). 
Furthermore, the MTC experienced challenges in collecting fees in the markets. Many traders 
refused to pay their fees because business had decreased since they moved into markets, so 
they were not making as much money (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:58-60; SERI, 2014). They also 
complained about the competition with unlicensed traders outside the markets who had 
replaced the traders who had been moved into the market – this is bad for business as customers 
then have no incentive or reason to go inside the market. JMPD exacerbated this as they 
accepted bribes from unlicensed traders in order to be left outside the markets. Traders also 
refused to pay fees because they were not getting any services, many traders complained about 
police harassment; the lack of responsiveness of MTC officials; and the lack of services and 
facilities such as toilets, cleaning, security and storage in the markets (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:58- 
60; SERI, 2014). 
 
A big problem the COJ created through the MTC, was the lack of management of street traders 
outside the taxi rank markets and linear markets. Instead of managing that situation, the City 
rendered all street traders operating outside the markets as “illegal”, and this led to the JMPD’s 
harsh and restrictive enforcement of the City’s Informal Trading By-Laws. JMPD had 
automatically become the body responsible for managing street traders and what was taking 
place was enforcement instead of management. 
 
The JPC continues to prioritize the relocation of street traders into markets. The JPC plans to 
introduce markets in mixed-use buildings, 10 buildings have been identified and 2 buildings 
have been successfully procured (DED, 2016:28). The vision is to establish an ‘iconic market 
in the heart of the CBD’ (DED, 2016:28), this vision is based on the Rotterdam Market Hall. 
The JPC hopes to create ‘an iconic project and flagship tourism destination’ (DED, 2016:28). 
In addition to that, the JPC plans to identify other sites where mixed-use markets can be 
established in the inner-city. The proposed products and services to be found in markets are 
second hand clothing, food, hairdressing, electronics, and traditional medicine. 
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e. An attempt at self-management 
To deal with some of the management challenges the MTC was facing, block leaders were 
elected and worked closely with MTC officials. They communicated issues faced by the street 
traders. They compiled the waiting list for MTC, and they ensured that lease agreements were 
signed, and rent was paid. Unfortunately, this model is not very transparent and clear, and it is 
often riddled with corruption (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:58-60; SERI, 2014). 
 
The MTC was very ineffective in managing street trading because of several reasons. Firstly, 
the mandate and aim of the MTC was not clear. The MTC was meant to manage markets but 
instead they ended up managing and dealing with traders, fee collection, trader registration, 
stall and smart card allocation (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:58-60; Tissington, 2009:39-40) – of which 
MTC failed dismally. This left a management gap, especially for those street traders who 
operated outside the markets. The MTC also struggled to deliver on its informally extended 
mandate because it did not have the adequate resources and capacity to implement what was 
expected of it. 
 
Secondly, the MTC was financially unsustainable. It can be argued that this was the main 
reason the MTC was disbanded and replaced by the JPC – Elliot (2018) confirmed this and 
stated that it was financially unsustainable for the DED to maintain the MTC. The MTC was 
meant to be an independent, self-sufficient entity that was able to generate a profit and fund its 
own projects (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:58-60; Tissington, 2009:39-40). However, this was not the 
case, the MTC was largely subsidized by the COJ through the transfer of operation funds. The 
City was very naïve in thinking that MTC would be self-sufficient. Street trading should be 
about recovering costs and not about profit-making (Pernegger, 2014). It is unrealistic for the 
state to expect the street traders to pay operating costs as most of them are survivalist - the state 
should therefore be subsidizing street trading (Dobson & Skinner, 2009). 
 
Due to all the management and financial challenges experienced by the MTC, it was disbanded 
and replaced by the JPC in 2013. However, it is not clear how this will rectify the problems 
faced by MTC as the JPC’s mandate focuses on property values and building regeneration 
(Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). 
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4.1.1.3. Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department 
The JMPD is responsible for enforcing the Informal Trading By-Laws. It can be argued that 
the JMPD is the key management institution in the public management of street trading. 
However, enforcement rather than management is evident, and it is sometimes reminiscent of 
street trading under apartheid. The problem is that street trading is criminalized in the City, and 
that there is a lack of institutions to effectively manage street trading and as a result JMPD 
becomes the key management institution. Whenever there is disorder, chaos and crime it is 
immediately viewed as a lack of enforcement and adherence to by-laws when in fact it is due 
to a lack of efficient and effective management (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:58-60; SERI, 2015) – so 
what manifests is the restriction, repression, and harassment of street traders. Some traders do 
recognize the need for the JMPD but more often than not many have a negative experience of 
the JMPD – most traders experience and witness police bribes on a regular basis and some 
admit bribing police in order to protect themselves against arbitrary harassment, confiscation 
and eviction (SERI, 2015:28-31; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:58-60). Some traders have described the 
JMPD as “tsotsis” and have witnessed the police breaking the law most days during their 
patrols (SERI, 2015: 27-31; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015: 60-63). Many traders complain of JMPD 
illegally allocating spaces in front of existing traders’ stalls to unregistered traders (SERI, 
2015:28; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015: 61-63). These unregistered traders are allowed to trade through 
continued bribes to the JMPD. 
 
JMPD officials use arbitrary manipulations of by-laws to demand bribes from street traders. 
Officials often accuse traders of displaying their goods untidily, displaying their goods beyond 
the demarcated limits of their trading sites, or of not maintaining the cleanliness of their trading 
sites (SERI, 2015:29;). JMPD officials resort to pettiness to solicit bribes from the traders. As 
SERI (2015:29) aptly states: 
 
“The City is certainly not absent from the management of informal trade in the inner- 
city. Its presence, though, is characterized by rent collection, site inspections, and 
arbitrary by-law enforcement by the JMPD” 
 
Corruption has been flagged as a major problem in the public management of street trading. 
This is inevitable in a situation where there is a problem of scarcity. In circumstances such as 
this, rent-seeking opportunities are high. 
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The establishment of block leaders to try trader self-management and decentralize street trading 
management has also been cited as a corruption site. Block leaders are elected by street traders 
in the relevant area, and they work closely with JPC officials to manage issues, grievances and 
complaints raised by street traders in the markets. They are responsible for submitting names 
to the JPC for the inner-city wide street trading waiting list. A trader wanting to trade in a 
particular block or street would approach the block leader, and be recorded on the block 
leader’s list, to then be integrated into the JPC inner city-wide street trading ‘waiting list’. 
Although this decentralization is welcome because of the flexibility, accessibility and 
empowerment of street traders, it is also problematic because it generates a level of opacity 
and creates opportunities for patronage and bribery (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:61). 
 
When I raised this with Elliot (2018), during an interview it was very clear that there were no 
mechanisms in place to deal with this challenge of bribery and corruption. The City believes 
that decentralizing the management of street trading and empowering the street traders will in 
fact decrease corruption, but it seems like the opposite is happening especially because of the 
scarcity of trading spaces. 
 
4.1.2. Private Management of Street Trading 
The private sector, through the CJP, manages a sizeable proportion of street trading in the 
inner-city. The private sector is in fact the leader in management initiatives in the inner-city, 
and street traders found in these areas have a far greater experience compared to those 
“managed” by the City. But this is not to say that private management does not have its 
problems and challenges. 
 
4.1.2.1. Central Johannesburg Partnership 
The CJP was established in 1992 and has developed and grown into a private, non-profit 
company dedicated to urban renewal and the revitalization of the City. It was formed as a 
partnership between formal business and the City. It was tasked with leading urban 
regeneration in the City. The CJP focuses on serving – with exceptional quality as well as 
forging a close working relationship with the City (Bénit- Gbaffou, 2015; Tissington, 2009). 
It is important to highlight the fact that the CJP’s primary client is business as this has an 
impact on the relationship between different stakeholders involved in the management of 
street trading in CJP managed areas. 
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There are two systems managed by the CJP. The first system involves property and/or business 
owners leasing the sidewalks in front of and around their buildings to manage street trading 
activity in front of their buildings. The second is done through CIDs, whereby property owners 
in an area handle managing street trading activities in that area. 
 
The City (through the former MTC) entered a Joint Venture Agreement with CJP in 1999 as 
part of urban renewal (Tissington, 2009:40-41; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:64). It was renewed twice 
until the contract expired in January 2008, the contract was not renewed due to financial 
disagreements between the two parties (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:64). Despite this, the CJP 
continues to informally manage street trading in certain parts of the inner-city, mainly CID 
areas. 
 
What is interesting is that CJP has not always been welcoming and supportive of street trading, 
it was one of the main actors who lobbied for the City to extend its prohibition of street trading 
to CID areas (Tissinger, 2009:40-41). It also supported the City’s decision to prohibit pavement 
street trading and move all street traders to markets (Tissinger, 2009:40-41). However, this has 
changed over the years, this is because the CJP has come to accept that street trading is a part 
of the inner-city and it is going nowhere, so it is better to acknowledge street traders than to 
deny their presence as it allows CJP to manage them (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:64). The South 
African National Traders Retail Alliance (SANTRA) is very skeptical of CJP because it does 
not believe that street trading can be managed by corporate led entities whose primary 
constituent and client is business. They argue that such entities have no interest in correcting 
the socio-economic imbalances of the past (Tissington, 2009:41). 
 
The CJP has played a significant role in the establishment of CIDs. CIDs are managed by UGM 
and they are paid by the CID property owners’ board through the board’s CID levy. UGM is 
responsible for managing the streets and traders, they do this through ensuring safety and 
security; making sure the streets are clean through the provision of necessary facilities and 
services; and they have regular meetings with block leaders to deal with any issues (Bénit- 
Gbaffou, 2015: 67-70). The CID levy covers the costs of street trading management, with little 
contribution from the City and street traders (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:68-70). The CJP is 
responsible for rent collection; lease agreements; and it serves as a communication link 
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between the relevant City departments and the UGM. The CJP operates independently and its 
processes and systems are very different to those of the JPC managed streets – the main reason 
for this difference could be explained by the JPC’s lack of capital, resources and capacity. As 
a result, the overall management of street trading in the inner-city is fragmented and 
inconsistent. Traders who operate within CJP managed CIDs are happy and ‘enjoy a sense of 
security and stability, dignity and pride’ that is not experienced in JPC managed areas (Bénit- 
Gbaffou, 2015:65-66). 
 
CIDs were a significant part of the City’s urban renewal plan and have played a significant role 
in drawing in investment and revitalizing the inner-city. CIDs have been praised for being 
efficient and effective mechanisms for drawing in private funding for urban regeneration, and 
for bringing in extra money in order to support urban management especially in a dense area 
such as the inner-city which demands extra support and resources but is faced with limited 
resources (Tissington, 2009:40-41; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:65-66). Inner-cities need more 
resources compared to other parts of the city because of their ‘densities and multiplicity of 
uses’ (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:65-66). 
 
As much as CIDs have positive benefits for the City, they have also been heavily criticized for 
being units of privatized governance with a lack of democratic representation and 
accountability. As previously mentioned, CIDs are made up of property owners who form the 
board of directors that make key decisions that affect those working and living in the areas that 
they operate in. Section 4(3) of the Gauteng City Improvement Districts Act 12 of 1997 states 
that although non-voting members – such as councilors, tenants and other stakeholders - of the 
board may be included in meetings, they do not have a say in the decisions made by the board. 
This makes the board a power unto itself with little democratic accountability. Furthermore, 
those most affected by their decisions – street traders – are excluded from decision-making. 
The problem with such mechanisms is that they tend to lead to private management of space 
which leads to the displacement and eviction of the poorest and most vulnerable (Miraftab, 
2007:603-604). Miraftab (2007:603-604) further criticizes CIDs for promoting ‘uneven social 
and spatial development characteristic of neoliberal spatiality.’ As soon as something does not 
fit into the vision of what the CID has planned, it is removed. This is seen in the prohibition of 
street trading in certain CIDs – Braamfontein and South Western CID. Traders are not 
consulted about these decisions which is in violation of Section 6 (2) of the Businesses Act. 
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CIDs tend to ‘restructure urban space to serve the ideal of a world-class city integrated into the 
global economy, at the cost of the city’s social and spatial integration’ (Miraftab, 2007:604). 
In doing so they create exclusive spaces for formal businesses and restrict the access of street 
traders to potential customers and business opportunities, which is unfair and discriminatory 
(Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:65-66). 
 
4.3. Informal Traders Forum 
The previous ITP gave provision for the establishment of the Informal Traders Forum (ITF). 
The City seemed to have had it right by setting up a multi-stakeholder platform for trader 
participation. Unfortunately, the ITF did not live up to its expectations due to several reasons. 
Firstly, the mandate and powers of the ITF were vague and unclear. The ITP stated that the 
purpose of the ITF was to provide ‘guidance, oversight, and advisory support related to the 
effective and successful implementation of the Informal Trading Policy and By-Laws’ (COJ, 
2009). It is not clear about whom they are providing this guidance, oversight and advisory 
support to. The ITF and its purpose was not taken seriously by the City, and as a result the ITF 
was not consulted for any key decisions affecting the livelihoods of street traders. 
 
Secondly, the ITF was meant to be comprised of key government officials from multiple 
departments relevant to the management of street trading, but this did not happen. Only one 
government official attended the ITF. This has significant implications on the impact of the 
ITF, the resolution of issues and accountability. It revealed the City’s disregard for street 
trading and the issues of street traders. And that they had no real intention or desire to include 
street traders in policy decisions around street trading in the City. 
 
Many traders complained about the following regarding the ITF (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:88): 
• The absence of circulation of minutes and agenda, 
• The disrespect of a proper period for calling a meeting (often one day before (this was 
the case with Operation Clean Sweep), and often oddly coinciding with traders’ 
organisations own internal meetings) 
• The irregularity of the meetings – and never at the traders’ initiative 
• The inability of traders to propose points for the agenda; 




The ITF lacked follow-up and real accountability from city officials and ended up being more 
of a ‘complaints and venting platform for traders where City Departments were not effectively 
attending’ (JPC, 2018:3). 
 
The operation of the ITF is closely linked to the politics of street trading organisations. 
Currently, street trading organisations are very fragmented, fragile and narrow-focused, and 
this unfortunately disadvantages the sector when it comes to engagement with the City as unity 
in the sector and collective awareness are prerequisites for engagement (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014). 
Street trading organisations are fragmented, fragile and narrow-focused. As a result, street 
trading organisations tend to have very little influence over government policy. However, 
there are some exceptions such as SEWA of India who have been instrumental in drafting the 
government’s innovative approach to street trading, they are also included in the management 
of street trading. SAITF and SANTRA were also instrumental in challenging the City’s 
unlawful conduct experienced in Operation Clean Sweep, if it were not for these two 
organisations the City would have gotten away with its unlawful actions and there would not 
be key shifts in government approaches to street trading in Johannesburg. 
 
South African Informal Traders Forum (SAITF) describes itself as a mother body 
or an umbrella structure to its affiliates much like other major union structures in South 
Africa (Ndlovu, 2014 interview in Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014). It was established in 2006 
and its main aim is to help informal traders and street traders form a united front to deal 
with the various challenges that individuals in the informal economy face on the daily. 
SAITF aims to unite individuals and organisations within the informal economy. It is 
very representative and inclusive, it represents all types of street traders and informal 
traders, licenced and unlicensed – which is rare amongst street trading organisations ) 
Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014). The Forum claims to have a membership (both individuals and 
organisations) of 9000 across the country, with only 2000 members in Johannesburg’s 
CBD (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014). SAITF works very closely with SERI, SERI serves as the 
Forum’s legal advisor and it educates its members on its rights. The main focus of 
SAITF is to protect the rights of its members and to protect its members from police 
harassment. It is also involved in coming up with solutions to the City’s 
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mismanagement of street trading, it recently submitted a proposal to the City for a self- 
management model for street trading in the inner-city (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014). 
 
South African National Traders & Retailers Alliance (SANTRA) is one of the few 
organisations that have played a key role in influencing policy around street trading in 
Johannesburg’s inner-city. The trade organisation was established in 2005. According 
to Mantanga (2014) SANTRA has a membership of 5000 street traders in Gauteng, 
including 3000 in the inner City, with 60 block leaders )Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014). 
SANTRA represents mostly street traders. SANTRA aims to protect its members right 
to trade free of harassment, and to influence government policy that impacts street 
trading at the local, provincial and national level (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014; Matjomane, 
2013). According to Matjomane (2013) SANTRA is effective in its efforts because it 
uses a number of techniques to influence government policy and put pressure on the 
government. SANTRA uses a number of strategies such as petitions, media campaigns, 
social networks, court cases and sometimes cooperation and development of pilot 
projects in alliance with the corporate sector (Matjomane, 2013). SANTRA also has 
strong social networks that it can draw upon for support in order to influence 
government policy and add pressure to the government. Its most victorious battle was 
the Constitutional Court Case against the City for Operation Clean Sweep. SANTRA 
along with SAITF challenged the City in Court and won the case, allowing traders to 
return to their trading spaces until further notice and the Court ordered the City to revise 
its policies and legislation around street trading. 
 
The City’s institutional framework and management of street trading in the inner-city is very 
fragmented and inconsistent. It lacks coordination and collaboration. The City has a problem 
effectively managing street trading because it lacks a cohesive, holistic and collaborative 
management approach – it can therefore be blamed for the chaos and disorderliness of street 
trading in the inner-city. What is concerning is that the City is not at the forefront of street 
trading management, instead it has delegated its responsibilities to MOEs and the private sector 
without coordinating and overseeing this process. It has a very hands-off approach. The City 
also lacks spaces for participation and consultation for street traders to influence government 
policy and programmes affecting street trading in the inner-city. 
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4.3. Conclusion 
This chapter looked at the institutional framework and management of street trading in 
Johannesburg’s inner-city. It discussed the departments and various entities responsible for the 
management of street trading and found that the current management model is very fragmented 
and inconsistent. It then discussed the various spaces of participation and consultation available 
to street traders to express their grievances and influence policy affecting their livelihoods and 
found that the City lacks meaningful spaces for participation. Street trader organisations and 
their flaws were discussed, although limitations to their meaningful impact were identified it 
was found that there are some organisations that have played a meaningful role in the 
management of street trading in Johannesburg’s inner-city. 
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Chapter 5: Operation Clean Sweep 
 
 





This chapter will discuss Operation Clean Sweep which took place under Parks Tau’s, the 
former Mayor of Johannesburg, administration in 2013. It will look at how Operation Clean 
Sweep has affected the City’s approach to street trading. It assesses the changes that have 
been made Post-Operation Clean Sweep and the implications those changes have had on the 
livelihoods of street traders. 
 
5.1. Operation Clean Sweep 
On the evening of the 30th   of September 2013, a meeting took place between JMPD officials, 
block leaders and most trader organisation leadership. The JMPD officials informed the 
relevant  parties  that  the  City  was  to  embark  on  a  clean  sweep  on  the  following  day  (1st     of 
October). This was supported by the traders who were present as there had been many 
complaints about traders who were working “illegally” and stealing customers; traders not 
paying rent; and traders not cleaning the public space that they operated in (Bénit-Gbaffou, 
2015:6-7; SERI, 2015). It was agreed that on the day the block leaders would assist the JMPD 
in distinguishing between “legal” (licensed) traders and “illegal” (unlicensed) traders. What 
was concerning about this meeting and agreement is that not all traders were present or 
represented; no agenda was circulated; no notice was given about the meeting; and traders had 
no opportunities to comment upon or oppose the final decision beforehand (Bénit-Gbaffou, 
2015:6-7; SERI, 2015)… essentially, the City did not follow due process before embarking on 
this operation. What followed was a month (1st    - 31st    of October) of mass violent removals 
reminiscent of apartheid’s repressive management of street trading. 
 
The JMPD forcefully evicted approximately 7000 traders, both licensed and unlicensed, from 
their trading stalls and confiscated their goods. The JMPD did not consult block leaders about 
which traders were licensed and which were unlicensed. According to the City, the purpose of 
Operation Clean Sweep was to rid the city of unsightly and disorderly trading areas which gave 
rise to disorderliness, crime and congestion (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015:6-7; SERI, 2015; Lekgowa 
& Nicolson, 2013; Constitutional Court, 2013:6). The City argued that the streets were so 
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congested that it was infringing on citizens’ rights to the proper use and enjoyment of the public 
space and its facilities (Constitutional Court, 2013:6). Clearly the City did not view street 
traders as citizens who also have the right to the very same public space. The City treated street 
traders as encroachers. 
 
Following the mass evictions, traders tried to engage with the City to negotiate an agreement 
where they could return to their lawful trading activities. On the 2nd   of November 2013, the City 
agreed to a verification process where traders would be required to re-register and if they were 
verified against the City’s system, they would be allowed to return to their stalls to continue 
trading (Constitutional Court, 2013:6-7; SERI, 2015:15-17). On the 4th  of November the traders 
had re-registered and completed their verification process, however they were not allowed to 
return to their trading sites – those who did were forcefully removed by the JMPD and their 
stalls were dismantled (Constitutional Court, 2013:6-7; SERI, 2014:15-17). Traders continued 
to engage with the City from the 8th   – 14th   of November 2013, but it became increasingly clear 
to them that the City had no intention of allowing them to return to their trading sites 
(Constitutional Court, 2013:6-7; SERI, 2015:15-17). The traders stated that it was becoming 
increasingly clear that Operation Clean Sweep was intended to permanently remove traders 
from their trading sites and relocate them to ‘unknown designated areas’, and in the meantime 
trading in their current sites was prohibited (Constitutional Court, 2013:6-7; SERI, 2015:15- 
17). On the 15th   of November, with the help of SERI, traders sought urgent interim relief at the 
South Gauteng High Court. SAITIF and SANTRA were the trader organisations that spear 
headed the litigation against the City. The City, appallingly, argued that the relief sought by 
the traders was not urgent as a result it was struck off the roll by the judge (Constitutional 
Court, 2013:6-7; SERI, 2015:15-17). No reasons were given for this decision. The implications 
of the High Court meant that traders would have to wait until February 2014 for a hearing, 
meaning that they would not be generating an income for 3 months. 
SERI applied to appeal this decision and sought urgent relief for the traders at the Constitutional 
Court. The Constitutional Court accepted the application on the following grounds 
(Constitutional Court, 2013:6-7; SERI, 2015:15-17): 
• It served the interest of justice; 
• It raised important Constitutional issues – issues such as the right to freedom of trade, 
and the right to dignity 
• Traders would have experienced ‘irreparable harm if urgent relief was not granted 
58  
 
SERI argued that the City’s actions were unlawful and contravened Section 6A of the 
Businesses Act; that the City threatened the livelihoods of 1000s of traders; and that the City 
violated the traders’ rights to freedom of trade and dignity (Constitutional Court, 2013:6-7; 
SERI, 2015:15-17). 
 
5.1.1. Constitutional Court Judgement 
 
 
‘When women and men in government disregard the law, their conduct may very well 
cause hardship, particularly for the vulnerable’ 
(Constitutional Court, 2013:4) 
 
 
The Constitutional Court gave a scathing judgement and scolded the City for its ‘flagrant 
disregard’ of the law and the traders’ rights (Constitutional Court, 2013:6). The Constitutional 
Court said that the City undermined the traders’ fundamental rights to trade and dignity – ‘the 
ability to earn money and support themselves is an important component of human dignity, 
without it they faced degradation and humiliation’ (Constitutional Court, 2013:17). Section 6A 
(3) clearly and comprehensively states the steps that should be followed when removing and 
relocating traders, however the City did not follow this procedure and its decision to relocate 
traders was flawed (Constitutional Court, 2013:17). Furthermore, the City’s decision to declare 
certain areas as prohibited or restricted did not follow Section 6A(2)(a). The City therefore 
acted unlawfully and had no regard for the impact this would have on the livelihoods of the 
traders affected (Constitutional Court, 2013). The Constitutional Court stated that the City’s 
attitude bordered on cynical. It ordered the City to rework its approach to street trading in the 
inner-city and find legal ways to respond to the challenges of managing street trading in the 
inner-city (Constitutional Court, 2013:16-17). The City was very unapologetic, it conceded 
that its actions were unlawful but expressed that it was ‘convenient’ (Constitutional Court, 
2013:16). 
 
Operation Clean Sweep was a perfect reflection of the COJ’s mismanagement; poor 
coordination and collaboration across municipal Departments; inconsistent nature and 
contradictory policy and attitude towards street trading. It revealed that the City was only 
progressive and developmental in its approach on paper, but restrictive and repressive in 
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practice. It revealed that the City had no regard for the livelihoods of street traders and saw 
street trading as a nuisance, chaotic and undesirable. 
 
5.2. Post-Operation Clean Sweep – Towards a New, Inclusive and Developmental 
Approach to Street Trade Management 
 
‘Informality is an inevitable part of many modern cities, especially in the developing 
world. Thus, the City needs to provide regulation, protection and support for both the 
Informal Sector as well as to balance their needs versus those of pedestrians on the 




A COJ Task Team was formed after Operation Clean Sweep. It included several municipal 
departments and stakeholders: DED, JMPD, JPC, JDA, Group Legal, Development Planning, 
Environmental Health; and CRUM. The purpose of the Task Team was to develop a new 
plan and approach to dealing with informal trading in the inner-city; to establish and ensure 
coordination and collaboration in formulating and implementing the new plan and approach; 
and to ensure coordination and collaboration in dealing with issues that arise (JPC, 2018). All 
existing processes were, and continue to be put on hold, to develop the new plan in consultation 
with relevant stakeholders. This is a huge problem and overly concerning because traders 
currently have no avenue to raise their issues, when I mentioned this to a senior official and 
asked what interim mechanisms were in place to ensure that traders had access to such in the 
meantime – no answer was given. 
 
The consultation process has taken place over two years due to the hostility of some 
stakeholders as some have been skeptical of the City’s intentions. The process is still not 
complete as many of the items that the City has worked on are still drafts, many of them were 
meant to be implemented this year but have not been implemented due to management issues 
that were not disclosed during the interview process. 
 
The DED (2016:7) identified that the current state of street trading in the inner-city is very 
disorganized and that this is negatively impacting on various stakeholders. What is interesting 
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is that the stakeholders that are mentioned are citizens and the private sector, street traders seem 
to be mentioned as an afterthought. 
 
A Draft Inner-City Trading Implementation Plan (the Plan) was established based on 
comprehensive consultation with multiple stakeholders. According to the document the Plan 
was  approved  by  council  on  the  23rd     of  July  2016  (JPC,  2018:1),  but  it  has  not  yet  been 
implemented. Reasons for this were not disclosed. 
 
The main elements and outcomes of the Plan are as follows: 
 
 
1. A comprehensive Traffic Study was conducted (see Appendix 3). The City 
recognized that there was no need for them to relocate street traders or prohibit/restrict 
street trading, instead they needed to accommodate more traders (DED, 2018: 2). This 
is a great step for the COJ as it is moving away from its restrictive manner which 
produces scarcity, towards a more accommodating and inclusive approach to street 
trading. 
1. Spaces where street trading was previously prohibited will now incorporate 
street trading, e.g.: Rissik – Joubert Street; Joubert – Hoek Street. However, 
there are restrictions to these additions, e.g.: only the right-hand side of the 
former can be used for trading, and only the left-hand side of the later can be 
used for trading. 
2. New streets were identified for trading. 
3. Decisions were made to remove parking bays and widen sidewalks to 
accommodate more traders. 
4. Existing trading areas and sites were evaluated to see where improvements 
could be made, e.g.: it was identified that some trading areas were overly 
congested therefore some traders would need to be moved in compliance with 
Section 6A (2) (DED, 2018:2). 
5. A street by street head count and survey was conducted by the DED to identify 
the number of traders in each street and the trading activities that take place in 
each street (DED, 2018:7). 
6. The DED identified what public ablutions and services were needed in each 
trading area to ensure effective trading and maintenance of public space (DED, 
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2018:8). This is a significant step as many traders have complained about the 
lack of public ablutions and services in their trading areas, especially publicly 
managed areas (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015; SERI, 2015). 
 
2. A new Informal Trading policy and a revision of the current Informal Trading 
By-Laws was meant to be completed and promulgated by the end of the 2017/2018 
financial year (DED, 2018: 3). 
 
3. JPC and DED is to finalize a street by street implementation plan over the next 
three years with thorough consultation with key stakeholders, especially street traders, 
to ensure that they are ‘not inconvenienced unnecessarily, which can lead to litigation’ 
and a communication breakdown (DED, 2018:3). 
 
4. The establishment of a Project Management Office solely responsible for the 
implementation of the Plan. The establishment of this office has been an issue as there 
is a challenge in finding a team that has the capacity to manage such a project (DED, 
2018:3). 
 
5. The re-establishment of the City-wide Informal Trading Forum (ITF). The DED 
plans to establish this ITF once it has finalized its internal processes and drafted policy 
discussion documents (DED, 2018:3). The DED wishes to establish a stronger, more 
capacitated ITF compared to the previous one which was more a ‘complaints and 
venting platform for traders where City Departments were not attending’ meetings 
(DED, 2018:3). 
 
6. The DED identified the need to establish a procurement process for trader 
registration and the issuing of smart cards (DED, 2018:8), which has been a 
challenge for a number of years. 
 
7. 8 Pillars of an effective Informal Trading Plan were identified (DED, 2018:4) 
1. Adopt an inclusive, developmental policy, supported by appropriate (revised) 
by-laws 
2. Appropriate institutional design based on full participation of stakeholders 
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3. Planning and development of trading areas 
4. Sustainable informal trader support and development 
5. Improved Regulation Model (People Process) 
6. Improved Operational Management Plan (separate from enforcement function) 
7. Enforcement and Education Plan 
8. Continuous Monitoring and Evaluation System 
 
 
There has been a shift in the City’s approach to street trading, however we will only know this 
for sure once the City implements its Plan. The past has shown that the City has a reputation 
of saying one thing but doing the exact opposite. What is concerning about the overall Plan is 
that it is quite vague about how it plans to manage street trading, it talks about being more 
progressive, supportive and inclusive but it is not very clear on how this will be achieved. It is 
not very clear on how it will improve on its management flaws, especially regarding issues 
such as JMPD harassment, brutality and corruption; the current fragmented and inconsistent 
management model; and the challenges of CIDs (the exclusion and lack of accountability 
created by private governance, and the privatization of public space). 
 
The DED also needs to be flexible in its implementation of the Plan especially when it comes 
to the registration of street traders and determining the number of street traders across the inner- 
city. The DED needs to understand that the number of traders fluctuates depending on the 
economic climate in the country, therefore the City needs to take the head counts as mere 
estimates. 
 
The biggest concern of the new Plan is that street traders are still not at the center of it, which 
means the City runs the risk of repeating past mistakes and encountering the same challenges. 
They had no representation on the COJ Task Team, their voice on the Task Team were 
representatives of CUBES and SERI who had put together research reports (In quest for 
sustainable models of street trading management: Lessons for Johannesburg after Operation 
Clean Sweep; ‘The End of the Street?’ Informal Traders’ Experiences of Rights and 
Regulations in Inner City Johannesburg) for the City, which suggested ways forward for the 
management of street trading in the inner-city Post-Operation Clean Sweep. They spoke on 
behalf of the traders. As much as it is great that they had some sort of representation it is still 
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problematic that they did not get a seat at the table, that they were excluded from key 
discussions that informed the Plan that impacts them the most. 
 
This research was interested in determining whether there was a noticeable shift in the attitude 
and approach towards street trading since the DA has been in governance. However, this was 
impossible to determine as the new government does not have a new ITP and they have not 
implemented any changes since the ANC government. The DA promises to be more 
supportive, developmental and inclusive – same promises made by the ANC government – but 
it will only be evident through implementation whether the DA government really is committed 
to supporting and developing street traders. 
 
5.3. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed Operation Clean Sweep that took place in 2013. The implications and 
consequences of Operation Clean Sweep were discussed and reviewed in relation to the 
Constitutional Court Judgement. It then looked at the shift and changes that the City adopted 
towards street trading Post-Operation Clean Sweep. 
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This chapter will focus on key findings and analysis. The City of Johannesburg faces three key 
challenges: a fragmented urban governance model; the creation of scarcity; and the battle to 
balance the desire to attain world-class African city status, and the socioeconomic needs of the 
poor and vulnerable. 
 
6.1. Fragmented Urban Governance 
Many of the problems the City faces around the management of street trading in the inner-city 
are due to the City’s fragmented and inconsistent management model. The City lacks a 
cohesive, collaborative and holistic approach to street trading. The City speaks into addressing 
this problem but is very vague about the specifics. 
 
The City complains about the chaos, disorderliness, uncleanliness, crime and grime present in 
the inner-city because of street trading, but it is to blame for this – if the City had an effective 
management model, and developmental approach to street trading, it would not face many of 
these challenges. Street trading is managed both publicly and privately, and in both instances 
the City has delegated the management to MOE’s and the private sector. This has caused 
problems on the ground, especially in the public management of street trading. 
 
6.1.1. JPC 
The JPC is faced with several problems that have contributed to the mismanagement of street 
trading. 
 
a. Smart Cards 
The problem is that the Department has not successfully procured the smart card system 
and street traders are currently operating with no smart cards which leaves them 
vulnerable to police harassment and corruption. This is a complex system that is 
proving to be a great challenge for the City and what is concerning is that there seems 
to be a lack of urgency in dealing with this matter, which is detrimental to the 
livelihoods of street traders. 
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b. Allocation of Stalls 
This can only be done once street traders have been allocated smart cards. The previous 
Policy was clear about the allocation process, the new Plan does not speak into this 
process. It is important that the City revises its allocation process as it is out of touch 
with reality, currently stall allocation is done informally, it is clientelistic and it involves 
the bribing of JMPD officials and block leaders. The JPC needs to produce a process 
that is not vulnerable to these challenges and a process that is in tune with the realities 
on the ground. 
 
c. Lease Agreements 
The City is guilty of not upholding its end of lease agreements. The City is responsible 
for providing infrastructure and services for street traders, but this is not happening. 
This lack of infrastructure and services contributes to what the City terms the filth, 
grime and health hazard that is the inner-city. The City blames street traders for this, 
but it is the City’s fault, as it is not playing its role in the management of street trading 
in the inner-city. Multiple municipal departments are responsible for the cleaning and 
maintenance of these areas, but this is not taking place. 
 
The City also needs to make its lease agreements more accessible and explain them to 
street traders. Many street traders have complained about the inaccessibility of the lease 
agreements and their lack of understanding about the purpose of the lease agreement. 
The City therefore needs to go through the lease agreement with street traders before 
street traders sign their leases. 
 
d. Self-Management 
The City has tried to introduce the self-management of street traders in the management 
of street trading in the inner-city, but this has been riddled with corruption. The City 
needs to identify ways that this can be dealt with as the self-management of street 
traders is a positive and welcomed approach to street trading management. 
 
e. Markets (including Linear Markets) 




It is concerning that the JPC is opting for the market route given that it has been 
experiencing challenges with its current markets. Traders have explicitly complained 
about the problems with markets, so it makes no sense for the City to create more 
markets to accommodate street trading as it is not beneficial to street traders – street 
trading is more responsive to natural markets where there is heavy foot traffic. If the 
City insists on this route it needs to ensure that these challenges and tensions are dealt 
with and do not affect street traders’ livelihoods. The City should, like Hsinchu City in 
Taiwan, also consider working collaboratively with the street traders to make this 
model work. If street trader organisations are at the forefront of this model street traders 
may be more receptive of it and street traders are more likely able to produce solutions 
to the problems this model presents since it is their lived experience. 
 
f. Communication between traders and JPC officials 
The communication between traders and JPC officials remains a challenge, this is 
because the City lacks proper, meaningful spaces for participation and consultation. 
The City hopes to rectify this through the establishment of a new Informal Trading 
Forum, which will have a stronger mandate than the previous one and be more 
responsive. The previous one served as a complaints and venting platform for street 
traders and it was unresponsive and lacked accountability as many department officials 
who were meant to attend this forum did not attend. 
 
6.1.2. JMPD: The Face of Street Trading Management 
There is no clear mandate or management approach to street trading publicly and this leads to 
the challenges of chaos, disorder, uncleanliness, crime and corruption. The City’s 
mismanagement of street trading leaves JMPD as the face of street management, but what is 
implemented is enforcement not management and often the two are conflated. The City 
emphasizes regulation and punishment of contraventions which criminalizes some aspects of 
street trading and opens opportunities for the abuse of power and corruption. The JMPD 
continuously uses its power to take advantage of the vulnerable street traders by soliciting 
bribes from street traders through the punitive and arbitrary implementation of the Informal 
Trading By-Laws. Traders end up operating under constant harassment by the JMPD, making 
it difficult for street traders to operate. The City needs to rectify this. JMPD officials undergo 
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training for 6 months before they are deployed, the City needs to use this as an opportunity to 
shift officials’ mindsets and attitudes towards street trading because as it currently stands, the 
JMPD is very restrictive and repressive instead of being supportive and making the 
environment conducive to street trading. 
 
Traders should also be educated about their rights and the City’s by-laws, at the moment they 
are too vulnerable to arbitrary implementation of by-laws by JMPD officials. Traders should 
also have the opportunity to anonymously report JMPD officials, the JPC should put a system 
in place to ensure this, as traders are too scared of harassment and arbitrary eviction and arrest 
if they stand up to JMPD officials. The City needs to play a greater role in the protection of 
street traders against JMPD officials especially since the harassment experienced by the street 
traders is due to the City’s mismanagement of street trading. 
 
This also raises a question of who is responsible for managing the streets for street trading. The 
DED has not been clear about this in its new approach to street trading – more emphasis, 




The biggest problem with the private management of street trading is that street traders’ 
interests are not prioritized. Business and property owners are the primary clients therefore 
their interests are prioritized. Although street traders enjoy many benefits from the private 
management of street trading, many privately managed areas prohibit trading in certain CIDs. 
Although some efforts have been made by the City to open some of these areas through the 
comprehensive Traffic Study that was done, there are still limitations to these areas meaning 
that few street traders will be accommodated. 
 
The CJP and JPC traders’ lists currently operate parallelly and are not consolidated, this needs 
to be rectified as the City needs to be aware of the number of traders present in the inner-city 
in order to accommodate them. The DED needs to establish a consolidated database for all 
traders. 
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Overall, the DED needs to be more hands-on in the management of street trading. Currently 
management is very fragmented and there is no coordination or collaboration across 
departments and key stakeholders. The City has delegated its responsibility to MOEs, this 
would not be a problem if the DED played its over-sight role, which it currently does not. Elliot 
(2018) and Raymond (2018) both cited the lack of uniformity across the City, and the lack of 
oversight the DED plays in the monitoring process as challenges in managing street trading in 
the inner-city. They also site the lack of coordination and collaboration across departments as 
a problem in the management of street trading. The new Plan aims to deal with these challenges 
but is very vague about how it plans to deal with them. Key departments and stakeholders need 
to be involved in drafting policies and programmes; implementing them; and monitoring and 
evaluating them. In that way there can be a pooling of resources and a multi-pronged approach 
to street trading management can be adopted. Such collaboration and coordination will also 
solve conflict over land use and competing interests (Healey, 1998). 
 
6.2. The Creation of Scarcity 
The DED stated that currently there are too many traders and not enough space in the City to 
accommodate them, that the carrying capacity of the streets has been reached. The City cites 
this as a great challenge to the management of street trading in the inner-city. However, I would 
argue that the City is intentionally creating scarcity to maintain a clean, orderly and attractive 
City. The City limits the number of legal trading spaces to serve the interests of the private 
sector and international investors. The creation of scarcity is a strategy and mechanism used 
by cities to limit the number of street traders in the city and maintain a certain image (Pezzano, 
2012). 
 
There is a shift away from the creation of scarcity, but there are still some restrictions in certain 
parts of the City – especially in CIDs. There is increasing inclusivity, but it continues to be 
characterized by restriction. This is evident in the City’s Traffic Study. It is also evident in the 
City’s Traffic Study that more accommodations can be made for street traders, the City just 
needs to be more lenient, creative and imaginative in its ways – which it has shown it can do. 
 
The City needs to move away from this restrictive management as it criminalizes street trading 
and contributes to corruption. Roy (2009) is correct in saying that the state (in this case the 
City) creates informality through over-regulation. The state creates unrealistic laws and 
69  
regulations that leave people with no choice but to break them, especially for people who are 
operating in the informal economy for survivalist reasons. Laws and regulations tend to be 
disconnected from what is happening on the ground, and ill-adapted and non-responsive to 
social or economic needs (Roy, 2009; Yitachel, 2009). This leads to the state criminalizing, 
illegalizing and informalizing people and communities (Roy, 2009; Yitachel, 2009). The City 
is aware that the demand for street trading is very high yet it continues to be restrictive in its 
accommodations, and insists on relocating street traders to markets. This is an unsustainable 
approach to the management of street trading in the inner-city, especially with the rising 
unemployment rate. 
 
The City’s creation of scarcity also leaves street traders vulnerable to harassment by JMPD 
officials and corruption. JMPD officials use this vulnerability to solicit bribes from street 
traders and they use the creation of scarcity to their advantage by illegally allocating trading 
sites to unlicensed traders. 
 
6.3. No Friends of Street Traders: World-Class Cities and Urban Renewal 
 
 
“…hawking in the city centre is an ongoing problem and controlling it is part of the 
drive to turn Johannesburg into a world-class city…” 
(Former JMPD spokesperson cited in Tissington, 2009) 
 
 
The City is battling to balance the desire to attain world-class African city status and the socio- 
economic needs of the poor and vulnerable. Unfortunately, a trade-off exists between the socio- 
economic needs of the poor and vulnerable, and the interests of investors and private business. 
What is concerning is that the City is unashamed of this trade off: 
 
“…while the needs of street traders to sustain a livelihood and explore and 
exploit future economic opportunities is [sic] very important, these needs 
cannot be met at the expense of the needs of commuters, pedestrians, 
formal businesses, residents, and other users of Inner City space for clean, 
safe and well organised public environment.” (COJ, 2009) 
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It is puzzling as to why the City is adamant on restricting street trading when it is a phenomenon 
that is part of all cities in the world; including world-class cities such as New York City, 
London and Milan. The problem is that the City is trying to replicate a model that is not suited 
for the Johannesburg context. Street trading looks different in different countries depending on 
how it is incorporated and managed. The City would not have a difficult time attaining this 
status and balancing the two demands if it properly managed street trading in the inner-city. 
Much of the complaints surrounding street trading - grime, disorder, chaos, urban decay – are 
a result of mismanagement. 
 
World-class cities tend to prioritize economic growth and attracting investment. This was 
evident in the City’s urban renewal project that took place in the early 2000s in order to deal 
with urban decay, reverse capital fight and draw investment back into the inner-city. Such 
projects have no patience or sympathy for street traders or any sort of informality as it 
jeopardizes economic growth and private investment. Unfortunately, this marginalizes the 
poor and the vulnerable – in this instance street traders. There is a need to make world-class 
cities more inclusive. 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter highlighted the key challenges faced by the City of Johannesburg in the 
management of street trading in the inner-city. It found that most of the challenges faced by 
the City are a result of mismanagement and these challenges could be addressed if the City 
adopted a cohesive and collaborative management approach to street trading. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
 
Street trading is a significant part of the inner-city of Johannesburg, especially in the context 
of rising unemployment in the country. It serves as a livelihood for 1000s of South Africans 
who do not have access to the formal economy. Therefore, there is a need for the City to be 
more inclusive, developmental and collaborative in its approach to street management. 
 
Chapter 3 revealed the City’s long history of repression and restriction towards street trading 
in the inner-city. Although some progress has been made towards a more developmental and 
inclusive management approach many challenges and restrictions remain, especially in CJP- 
managed areas which continue to exclude street traders in their CIDs. During colonialism and 
apartheid, street trading was heavily restricted and regulated as it was seen as portraying 
disorder and underdevelopment. Street trading was heavily restricted and regulated through 
influx control laws; a limitation of trading spaces; and the ‘move-on’ policy. The street traders 
who operated under these harsh restrictions were subject to police harassment on the daily. 
What is shocking is that police harassment persists post-colonialism and post-apartheid. 
 
Chapter 5: Operation Clean Sweep revealed that one of the main problems in the City in the 
management of street trading is the City’s fragmented urban governance model. The City lacks 
a cohesive, holistic and collaborative street trading management approach. This is because the 
City has delegated street trading management to MOEs without overseeing or coordinating the 
activities of these entities and this has resulted in a fragmented, inconsistent and corrupt 
management model. It has also led to enforcement being conflated with management as the 
JMPD has become the face of street management. It has also failed to coordinate and establish 
collaboration across multiple municipal departments, which is crucial for the effective and 
efficient management of street trading – street trading requires multiple departments to manage 
its activities. It has also led to the exclusion of street traders in some parts of the CJP-managed 
trading areas – CIDs. 
 
Currently, there are no concrete institutions or policies in place to manage street trading since 
everything was put on hold after Operation Clean Sweep. The City is still finalizing systems 
and policies to manage street trading. It is very concerning that it has taken the City 5 years to 
rectify this, and still there is nothing of substance in place. This leaves street traders very 
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vulnerable as they have no channels of communication with the City and there is currently no 
policy regulating street trading. The only piece of legislation in place is the Informal Trading 
By-Laws which mainly serves to protect the interests of the City and not the street traders. The 
City’s Draft Informal Trading Implementation Plan speaks into many of these challenges, but 
it is very vague about how it plans to address these challenges. 
 
At the beginning of the study one could be sympathetic to the City of Johannesburg because 
of the complexity of managing street trading, however this could change as one immerses 
themselves deeper into research. Chapter 6 revealed that many of the challenges the City of 
Johannesburg faces with regards to the management of street trading in the inner-city is self-
imposed. But what the City tends to do is shift the blame onto street traders, who have 
become victims of the City’s gross mismanagement of street trading and has left them 
vulnerable to police harassment. It also revealed that street trading within the inner-city is 
highly contested because there are several contesting interests at play because the inner-city 
has multiple uses and serves as the economic hub of the City. The City battles to manage all 
these interests and unfortunately the people who bear the brunt of this are the poor and 
marginalized – being street traders. This is because the City does not prioritize the socio-
economic needs of the urban poor. Instead what is prioritized is the attainment of the world-
class African city status, and the interests of business, property owners and the international 
investors in the name of economic growth and development. This vision is unsympathetic to 
street traders who end up being excluded from economic activity and the City’s urban space. 
This is a problem because it perpetuates the spatial and economic inequalities of the past. 
 
The City treats street traders as encroachers who do not have the right to the city, they are not 
treated as stakeholders who have access to the City’s urban space. The City intentionally 
criminalizes street trading through the creation of scarcity, the City insists that the inner-city 
has reached its carrying capacity, but this is not the case – this is just a mechanism and strategy 
used to limit the number of traders in the inner-city in order to maintain the orderly and clean 
image of the world-class African city. 
 
This research hopes to contribute to the understanding of the complexity of the management 
of street trading in the inner-city and hopes to inform policy and practice in the urban 
management of street trading. A comprehensive study solely looking into the formulation of 
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the new Informal Trading Policy in Johannesburg is needed. The lack of transparency in the 
formulation of the new Informal Trading Policy and the mere lack of an ITP has left many gaps 
in this research that only the ITP could have filled. The new ITP is needed to meaningfully 
gauge whether the City really has shifted its approach. And the implementation of the ITP 
needs to be evaluated and monitored to see whether there has been a shift in the City’s 
management approach. This is important as the City has a long history of being inconsistent 
and contradictory when it comes to policy and practice. 
 
Much of the research, including mine, that is related to street trading and city governance is 
biased towards street traders, I would argue that this is due to the fact that it becomes starkly 
clear during research that the City is guilty of marginalizing, criminalizing and excluding street 
traders. However, there is a need to conduct less biased studies when looking at the 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Interview Consent Form 
 
 
University of Cape Town 
Faculty of Humanities 
Consent Form 
 
Title of research project: What are the challenges facing the City of Johannesburg in the 
Management of Street Trading? 
 
Names of principal researcher: Nompumelelo Zulu 
 
Department/research group address: Department of Political Studies, University of Cape 





Name of participant: 
Nature of the research: Interviewing officials who are responsible for the day-to-day 
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Name	of	person	who	sought	consent:	     
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Appendix 3: Inner-City Traffic Study 
 
